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CONVERSION OF MOTOR CARRIERS FROM CONTRACT
TO COMMON UNDER SECTION 312(c) OF THE INTER-
STATE COMMERCE ACT
INTRODUCTION
In 1957 Congress amended the definition of "contract carrier by
motor vehicle." ' The new definition provides that a contract carrier is:
"any person which engages in transportation by motor vehicle of
passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce, for com-
pensation . ., under continuing contracts with one person or a
limited number of persons either (a) for the furnishing of transporta-
tion services through the assignment of motor vehicles for a continuing
period of time to the exclusive use of each person served or (b) for
the furnishing of transportation services designed to meet the distinct
need of each individual customer." 2
In conjunction with the revised definition, provision was made for the
conversion into common carriers of existing contract carriers whose opera-
tions did not comply with the new definition. The procedure for conversion
was established in the following manner:
"The Commission shall examine each outstanding permit and may
within one hundred and eighty days after August 22, 1957 institute a
proceeding either upon its own initiative, or upon application of a
permit holder actually in operation or upon complaint of an interested
party, and after notice and hearing revoke a permit and issue in lieu
thereof a certificate of public convenience and necessity, if it finds,
first, that any person holding a permit whose operations on August
22, 1957 do not conform with the [new] definition of a contract
carrier in section 303(a) (15) . . .; second, are those of a common
carrier; and third, are otherwise lawful. Such certificates so issued
shall authorize the transportation, as a common carrier, of the same
commodities between the same points or within the same territory
as authorized in the permit." 3
The purpose of this Note is to analyze some of the problems created
by these amendments.
1. 71 Stat. 411 (1957), 49 U.S.C. §303(a) (15) (Supp. V, 1958).
2. Ibid.
3. 71 Stat. 411 (1957), 49 U.S.C. §312(c) (Supp. V, 1958). A time limit within
which one may apply for a certificate is a common provision in statutes of this nature.
49 Stat. 551 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 306(a) (1) (1952) ; 49 Stat. 552 (1935),
as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1) (1952). See also 54 Stat. 941 (1940), 49 U.S.C.
§ 909 (1952) where a similar procedure was established for water carriers.
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Background
Carriage by motor vehicles came under regulation by the Interstate
Commerce Commission in 1935. 4  Because of the large number and the
differing character of motor carriers, Congress found it necessary to vary
the form of regulation followed in the earlier railroad legislation, and to
delineate three types of carriers: common, contract, and private.5 The
statute as amended in 1940, specifically defined a common carrier as one
who "holds itself out to the general public to engage in . . . transporta-
tion," 6 and a contract carrier was defined as one who engages in trans-
portation "under individual contracts or agreements." 7
The rights and duties of each were designed to accord with pre-
statutory service and practices. Thus those carriers who "held themselves
out" as common carriers 8 were, like railroads, subjected to restrictions in
their freedom of action and to positive duties. These restrictions and
duties included: providing the general public with safe and adequate service
and facilities; 9 establishing just and reasonable rates; 10 refraining from
giving any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any person
or locality; "1 filing and keeping open for public inspection tariffs showing
transportation and service rates,1 2 and operating under risk of extensive
liability for loss of or damage or injury to property transported. 13 In
addition, in order to acquire any new certificate an applicant was required
to show "public convenience and necessity." 14
4. 49 Stat 543 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1952).
5. 49 Stat 544 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §303(a)(14)-(17) (1952). A
private carrier of property is one who is not included in the definition of common or
contract carrier and who transports goods of which he is the owner, lessee or bailee,
when such transportation is for the purpose of sale, lease, rent, or bailment or in
furtherance of any commercial enterprise. Neither private carriers themselves nor
their relation to common and contract carriers will be discussed in this Note.
6. 54 Stat. 920 (1940), 49 U.S.C. §303(a) (14) (1952).
7. Act of Sept. 18, 1940, ch. 722, 54 Stat. 920.
8. 54 Stat. 920 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 303(a)(14) (1952).
9. 49 Stat. 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §§316(a), (b) (1952).
10. Ibid.
11. 54 Stat. 924 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1952).
12. 49 Stat 560 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §317 (1952).
13. 49 Stat. 560 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 319 (1952). See also Bigley
Trucking Corp. v. United States, 137 Ct. Cl. 903, 149 F. Supp. 141 (1957) (dictum).
A carrier may, however, under certain conditions, be subjected to only limited
liability. Caten v. Salt City Movers & Storage Co., 149 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1945);
Cray v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 177 Pa. Super. 275, 110 A.2d 892 (1955).
14. 49 Stat. 551 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 307 (1952). In determining public convenience
and necessity the Commission considers whether the proposed authority will serve a
useful purpose, responsive to public demand or need, whether existing carriers can
adequately serve the available business, and whether granting the proposed authority
will endanger or impair operations of existing lines contrary to the public interest.
See Administratimo of the Motor Carrier Act, 23 ICC PR.c. J. 1, 8 (1956). (This
publication consisted of questions and answers prepared by the Commission on the
administration of the Motor Carrier Act in reply to a request of the Senate Com-
mittee on Small Business.) Cf. Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83
(1957); Ratner v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 518 (S.D. Ill.), aff'd, 356 U.S. 368
(1958) ; Lang Transp. Corp. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 915 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
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Contract carriers were not subjected to any of the above restrictions
and duties. They were free to discriminate as to the shippers for whom
they would haul, the prices charged and the services rendered. 6 How-
ever, they were not permitted to serve the public generally; rather they
were proscribed from rendering services except under individual contracts
or agreements with their shippers,'0 and, in providing such separately
negotiated services, were limited to "reasonable minimum rates." 17 In
contrast to the common carrier, a contract carrier seeking a new permit
was required to establish only consistency with the public interest and the
national transportation policy.
18
These differing restrictions placed on the two classes of carriers gave
certain very definite competitive advantages to the contract carrier. Thus
the contract carrier could both pick his shipper and make special rates for
each specific job, while the common carrier was strictly limited in his
choice of whom he would serve, and was bound to abide by his published
tariff rates. 9 However, the distinction as to the extent of services in which
each class could engage was not clearly delineated.20 The Commission
attempted to clarify the limited rights of contract carriers by promulgating
a policy that they were limited to specialized service designed to meet the
peculiar needs of a particular shipper.2' This essential specialization should
"consist . . . of . . . furnishing . . . equipment especially de-
signed to carry a particular type of commodity . . ., training em-
15. See Administration of the Motor Carrier Act, 23 ICC PRAc. J. 1, 8, 14 (1956).
See also B & F Bus Serv., Inc., 53 M.C.C. 501, 505 (1951). Cf. 71 STAT. 343, 49
U.S.C. §318(a) (Supp. V, 1958).
16. Act of Sept. 18, 1940, ch. 722, 54 Stat. 920.
17. 71 Stat. 343 (1957), 49 U.S.C. §318(a) (Supp. V, 1958).
18. Act of Aug. 9, 1935, ch. 498, § 209(b), 49 Stat. 552, as amended, ch. 722,
54 Stat. 912 (1940) (now 71 Stat. 411 (1957), 49 U.S.C. § 309(b) (Supp. V, 1958)).
Originally this clause was interpreted to mean merely not contrary or hostile to the
public interest. See Scott Bros., Inc., 2 M.C.C. 155 (1937). Recent cases, however,
have imposed a burden approaching that upon the applicant for common carriage in
that, if presently authorized common carriers are ready, willing and able adequately
and satisfactorily to serve the shippers, the application will be denied. Leo Holt, Jr.,
77 M.C.C. 141 (1958); Kilmer Transp. Co., 53 M.C.C. 561 (1951), aff'd, 61 M.C.C.
147 (1952). Similarly if granting the permit "may" impair the operations of common
carriers the application will be denied. See B & F Bus Serv., Inc., 53 M.C.C. 501
(1951).
In the 1957 amendment of the statute the Commission is directed to consider, in
determining new applications for permits, "the number of shippers to be served . . .,
the nature of the service proposed, the effect which granting the permit would, have
upon the services of the protesting carriers and the effect which denying the permit
would have upon the applicant and/or its shipper and the changing character of that
shipper's requirements." 71 Stat. 411 (1957), 49 U.S.C. § 309(b) (Supp. V, 1958).
19. Contracts of Contract Carriers, 1 M.C.C. 628, 629-30 (1937); Carraway,
Motor Carrier Operating Authorities, 11 VAND. L. Rzv. 1029, 1030 (1958).
20. N. S. Craig, 31 M.C.C. 705 (1941). But see Contract Steel Carriers, Inc. v.
United States, 128 F. Supp. 25, 28 (N.D. Ind. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 409 (1956).
21. See, e.g., J. E. Bejin Cartage Co., 53 M.C.C. 255 (1951). See also H. R.
Ritter Trucking Co., 52 M.C.C. 501, 508 (1951), where the carrier supplied both
special equipment and skilled personal services. See also Armored Carrier Corp.,
64 M.C.C. 643 (1955); Motor Ways Traffic Bureau, 62 M.C.C. 413 (1954); Trans-
portation Activities of Fischbach Trucking Co., 61 M.C.C. 185, 195 (1952). Cf. Doyle
Transfer Co. v. United States, 45 F. Supp. 691 (D.D.C. 1942).
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ployees in the proper handling of particular commodities, or . . .
related non-transportation services such as assembling, placing or
servicing of machinery .... [Similarly] it may consist of nothing
more than the devotion of all a carrier's efforts to the service of a
particular shipper, or at most, a very limited number of shippers,
under a continuing arrangement which makes the carrier virtually a
part of the shipper's organization." 
22
It is of essence in this statement of the Commission's position on specializa-
tion that the Commission considered the number of contracts held and the
ease of turnover of contracts as indicative of whether specialization in fact
existed 3  The line of distinction thus established persisted until 1956, when
the Supreme Court, in United States v. Contract Steel Carriers, Inc.,
2 4
held that the Commission, by imposing such requirements, had improperly
departed from the statutory definition.
Contract Steel Carriers Case
Contract Steel Carriers, a licensed contract carrier, had from 1951 to
1954 mushroomed its original thirteen contracts into sixty-nine. It
achieved its rapid expansion by actively soliciting business through an
aggressive sales campaign. Upon complaint of a motor carrier traffic
bureau 2 5 and two carriers who claimed to be losing business due to Con-
tract's low rates, the Commission ordered it to cease operating as a common
carrier. The Commission's opinion was based on the fact that the defend-
ant was no longer rendering specialized and individualized services, but
rather was "holding itself out to the general public." On appeal the
District Court reversed the Commission 2 6 and the Supreme Court
affirmed the District Court.2 7 The Supreme Court noted that if specializa-
tion were to be read into the statutory defifiition, such requirement would
be satisfied so long as the carrier confined its operations to the commodity
restriction of its permits.28  The Court thus eliminated the Commission's
22. N. S. Craig, 31 M.C.C. 705, 712 (1941). Accord, Midwest Transfer Co.,
49 M.C.C. 383, 404-05 (1949). See also Doyle Transfer Co. v. United States, 45
F. Supp. 691 (D.D.C. 1942). Cf. Armored Carrier Corp. supra note 21, at 646-47,
where the Commission, in light of highly specialized service, said that the operations
of the company were those of a contract carrier even though it had contracts with
a substantial number of banks (approximately 1,000).
23. Midwest Transfer Co., supra note 22, at 404-05.
24. 350 U.S. 409 (1956) (per curiam). This case is noted in 43 CORNELL L.Q.
96 (1957).
25. A motor carrier traffic bureau is an association of motor carriers which has
combined to determine policy and rules as to rates and practices of its members.
Such joint activity is specifically authorized by § 5(b) of the Interstate Commerce
Act. 62 Stat. 472 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 5(b) (1952).
26. 128 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Ind. 1955).
27. United States v. Contract Steel Carriers, Inc., 350 U.S. 409 (1956) (per
curiam).
28. Id. at 412. Certificates of public convenience and necessity issued to common
carriers and permits issued to contract carriers usually restrict both the commodities
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test for determining whether a carrier was "holding itself out": specialized
service as evidenced by the number of contracts. The Court apparently
considered the common-law standard of "holding oneself out" (inviting the
patronage of the general public and serving them indiscriminately) sufficient
under the terms of the statute to distinguish contract carriage (individual
contracts individually negotiated).29 While the defendant actively solicited
business, achieved an extraordinary expansion, and had an easy turnover
of contracts thereafter, the Court indicated that such evidence did not
support the Commission's finding that the defendant was "holding itself
out" as a common carrier. It concluded that "a contract carrier is free
to aggressively search for new business within the limits of his license." 30
Naturally the Commission did not receive the decision with favor, for
the policy which it had felt required to establish for the protection of
competing common carriers was flatly overturned. It had previously
proposed an amendment to clarify the status of the various classes of
carriers,3 1 and now it renewed its efforts. At the Commission's behest a
bill was introduced to incorporate the Commission's own test into the
statute.
3 2
In the ensuing hearings, Commission Chairman Clarke, testifying
before the Senate, pointed out that it had become extremely difficult to
determine the line of demarcation between common and contract carriers; 3
that some contract haulers had acquired so many contracts that they were
in effect performing common carrier service; and that if the resulting
diversion of traffic were permitted to continue it might seriously impair the
ability of common carriers to render adequate service to the general public.
Since only common carriers had a duty of providing adequate facilities and
service available to the public generally, such a result appeared un-
desirable.3 4 The bill as finally passed by Congress was a compromise be-
which may be carried and the territories which the carrier may serve. Authority
for these restrictions is found in 49 U.S.C. §§308(a), 304(b), 309(b). Contract
Steel Carriers was authorized to carry steel articles in highway construction. There
was no claim that it had carried commodities in violation of its permit.
29. 350 U.S. 409, 412 (1956). The per curiam opinion offered very limited
discussion of the problem, the Court ordering affirmance "because the ICC's order
is . . . contrary to the definitions of contract and common carriers in § 309(14) and
(15)." Id. at 413. The Court appeared to rely on the district judge's definition of
terms. 128 F. Supp. 25, 28-29, 52 (1956). Justices Frankfurter and Harlan dis-
sented, being of opinion that the Commission had not departed from the common-law
standard.
30. 350 U.S. 409, 412 (1956). It is interesting to note that the Court did not
base its decision on § 309(b) which specifically provides that a carrier shall have the
right to substitute or add contracts. Rather, its opinion is based on the statutory
definitions of contract and common carriers.
31. S. 1920, H.R. 6141, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). See also 69 ICC ArN.
REP. 131 (1955).
32. S. 1384, H.R. 5123, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). See also 70 ICC AN.
REP. 163 (1956).
33. As to this difficulty see 4 KNORST, INTERSTATE CmmEsacE LAW AND PRAcrIcs
1984 (1958).
34. Hearings on S. 1384 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1957). Cf. B & F Bus
Serv., Inc., 53 M.C.C. 501, 505 (1951).
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tween the position of the common carriers and the Commission that contract
carriers be considerably limited,35 and that of the contract carriers who
had benefited from the favorable holding in Contract Steel. Although the
House report on the proposed bill indicated that all interested parties
approved, 3 it is apparent that the approval of the contract carriers was
based upon a realization that some restrictions were going to be imposed,
and that the compromise bill was at least more favorable than some of
the earlier proposals.
Unlike the prior definition,3 7 this new legislation specifically requires
continuing contracts 38 with only one or a "limited number" of shippers 3 9
It also imposes the "distinct need" or the "assignment of vehicle" test that
the Commission had already read into the old definition.40 Thus it was
hoped that the change brought about by the Contract Steel case would be
nullified.4 ' However, since it was evident that those carriers who had
actively solicited business and acquired a large number of contracts, and
those carriers whose operations were not directed to the peculiar needs of
shippers in terms of specialized service or assignment of vehicles, would
no longer fall within the definition of contract carrier, Congress authorized
their conversion into common carriers.
4 2
35. S. REP. No. 703, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5 (1957).
36. H.R. Rm'. No. 970, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1957).
37. See text accompanying notes 7, 20 supra.
38. In United States v. Contract Steel Carriers, Inc., 350 U.S. 409 (1956), the
Court gave little or no weight to the noted easy turnover of the carrier's contracts.
39. See note 30 supra, where it is pointed out that previously the statute had
specifically permited a carrier "to substitute or add contracts." It is not clear pre-
cisely how few contracts will be considered a "limited number." As Chairman Clarke
indicated in his testimony at the Senate subcommittee hearing on the proposed amend-
ment, the permissible number will vary according to the nature of the carrier's opera-
tions and the shippers' needs, and indeed would not necessarily be the same for each
transport company. Hearings on S. 1384, supra note 34, at 35. Compare his remark
that a hundred contracts under any circumstances would not be a limited number
with Armored Carrier Corp., 64 M.C.C. 643 (1955), where a contract carrier was
granted an extension of its rights notwithstanding the fact that it had contracts with
1000 banks.
40. Cf. N. S. Craig, 31 MC.C. 705 (1941) ; cases cited in notes 20, 21 supra.
41. New York has enacted a somewhat similar definition of contract carrier by
motor vehicle. It requires special and individual continuing contracts with one or
a limited number of shippers, for the furnishing of service of a special and individual
nature. N.Y. PuB. SEav. LAw § 2(30) (d). Interestingly enough, the legislature
thus amended the definition only after the New York Court of Appeals had reached
a result similar to that of the Supreme Court in the Contract Steel case. Matter
of Motor Haulage v. Maltbie, 293 N.Y. 338, 57 N.E.2d 41 (1944), involved a
carrier with over 100 contracts. Apparently the state legislature agreed with the
dissent in that case, that to permit such a carrier to expand without limitation is
to create a "[loop]hole big enough for petitioner to drive its truck through." Id.
at 52.
42. The statute provides that the carrier may be converted in a proceeding
instituted by him, by an interested party, or by the Commission. 71 Stat. 411 (1957),
49 U.S.C. § 312(c) (Supp. V, 1958). In fact, the carrier required to convert may well
not have wanted his classification changed. Since Congress cannot take private property
for a public use without just compensation, such a carrier may argue that it is being
unconstitutionally deprived of property. The argument would be supported by Frost &
Frost Trucking Co. v. R. Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926); Michigan Pub. Util.
Comm'n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925). In the Duke case the Court held alternatively
that a statute providing that all haulers by motor vehicle are common carriers con-
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REQUIREMENTS FOR CONVERSION
The statutory provision for conversion to common carrier status
contains three specific requirements which a carrier must meet. It is clear
that these requirements are exhaustive and that the public convenience
and necessity which must ordinarily be established to acquire a certificate
to serve as a common carrier need not in addition be shown.4 It must
only be established (1) that on August 22, 1957, the carrier's operations
were not in conformity with the new definition; (2) that its operations are
those of a common carrier; and (3) that its operations are otherwise law-
ful.4 The first requirement effectively limits to a specific group the
number of the carriers who may be converted under this section; if a
contract carrier, one meeting the new statutory definition of contract
carriage at the cut-off date, later should become desirous of converting to
common status, he could not do so by merely changing the nature of his
operations or increasing the number of his contracts, but rather would
have to show that public convenience and necessity would be served by
such a change. Under the new "limited number" of contracts, "assign-
ment" of vehicles, and "distinct need" tests of contract carriage, there
remain, of course, problems of determining how many contracts are "too
many," and whether a carrier who has offered a minimal amount of
specialized service in relation to the number of his contracts or a carrier
who has assigned a limited number of his total vehicles should be treated
as operating as a common carrier. A reasonable solution of these problems
verted property used exclusively in the business of private carriage into that of public
carriage, therein constituting a taking of private property for public use without just
compensation, in violation of the fourteenth amendment. In the Frost case, the Court
found that a California statute, as interpreted by its courts, withheld the use of state
highways to private carriers unless they dedicated their property to the business of
public transportation, subject to all the duties and burdens of common carriers. The
Court again held that private carriers cannot be converted into public carriers against
their will without just compensation. However, these cases are old and of questionable
authority. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536-37 (1934): "there is no
dosed class or category of businesses affected with a public interest . . . ." In
this case, New York had established minimum prices for milk. The Court concluded:
"it is equally clear that if the legislative policy be to curb unrestrained and harmful
competition by measures which are not arbitrary or discriminatory it does not lie
with the courts to determine that the rule is unwise." Such language certainly would
seem to be applicable to the instant statute See also Fordham Bus Corp. v. United
States, 41 F. Supp. 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (Frank, Cir. J.), where the carrier unsuc-
cessfully presented this very argument. Moreover, the conversion here authorized is
distinguishable from that in the Duke and Frost cases, for here only those carriers who
are conducting operations very similar to that of traditional common carriage are
being converted. The conclusion that these carriers by their very activity have so
conducted themselves as to be accountable to the public seems justified.
In fact, the Commission, under § 312, has examined 2,600 contract-carrier permits:
417 applications for conversion from contract to common carrier status were filed;
and 313 investigations were instituted to determine whether conversion should be
authorized. Only one complaint seeking conversion was filed by an interested third
party. The majority of these proceedings are still pending. 77 ICC ANN. REP. 44
(1958).
43. H.R. REP. No. 970, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1957).
44. The specific wording of the statute is set forth in text accompanying note 3
supra.
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would appear to be for the Commission to place a strict interpretation on
the number of contracts held, and if there are an extensive number of
contracts, conversion should be required whether or not there was some
specialization or assignment of vehicles.4 Although there may be some
doubt as to the wisdom of such a procedure, it appears to be in accord with
the legislative intent.
The provisions requiring that the carrier's operations be those of a
common carrier, and otherwise lawful, are, however, still less easily under-
stood and applied. Are the operations referred to, here, too, as in the
first required finding of non-contract carriage, those of August 22, 1957,
or are they those at the time of initiation of the proceedings, or those at
the time of hearing by the examiner or by the Commission, if there be a
review? The specified date, in terms, qualifies only the first finding; since
the language is ambiguous one cannot be sure how the Commission will
determine a conversion case where on August 22, 1957, the carrier's
operations were similar to those of a common carrier, but are no longer
such, due, for example, to a loss of contracts. The same question is
applicable in the situation, where, after the act's effective date, the carrier
engages in illegal activities. It would appear that the most reasonable
interpretation for the Commission to apply, in light of the fact that any
result will be arbitrary to a great extent, is that August 22, 1957, the
effective date of the amendment, be the cut-off date. This seems most
closely consonant with the statutory language.4
The second requirement, operation as a common carrier, is fraught
with difficulty. The draftsmanship of this section leaves a great deal to
be desired. By its precise terms it would appear to require the Commission
to license as a common carrier any holder of a contract carriage permit
whose operations constituted holding himself out to serve the public,47
whether or not those operations were within the scope of the permit issued,
and whether or not lawful within the ban of section 306(1), proscribing
operations as a common carrier without holding a certificate.48 The phrase
"whose operations" must modify "person," not "permit," since only the
45. In Aero Motor Line, Inc., No. MC-47616 (Sub-No. 6), ICC, 1958, the Com-
mission, which had initiated the proceedings, found that the carrier provided two of
its eighteen shippers with some equipment for virtually their exclusive use. The
operations were nevertheless held those of a common carrier. The examiner noted
that the services rendered were of a type which, for the most part, could have been
offered by specialized common carriers. Cf. J. Miller Co., 42 M.C.C. 709 (1943),
for an example of specialized service by common carrier.
46. In Michigan Transp. Co., No. MC-52978 (Sub-No. 15), ICC, 1958, the
examiner determined the nature of the operations as of August 22, 1957. A similar
determination was made in Aero Motor Line, Inc., mipra note 45. The examiner
in Emery Transp. Co., No. MC-9685 (Sub-No. 58), ICC, 1958, was more cautious,
and determined that the operations of the applicant both on and after August 22,
1957, were those of a common rather than those of a contract carrier.
47. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
48. 49 Stat 551 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §306(1) (1952) provides that
no carrier shall engage in commerce as a common carrier unless there is in force with
respect to it a certificate of public convenience and necessity.
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aggregate operations of the person, not those authorized in the specific
permit, could be found not those of a contract carrier under the first
requirement. And the third requirement, that activities be not "otherwise
unlawful," appears to exempt any unlawfulness with regard to carrier
status under the second requirement, and to refer only to illegality of
operation in spheres other than that of unlicensed common carrier opera-
tions. This would lead to the result that a permit holder who was engaging
in extensive carriage outside of the scope of its permits and in violation of
section 306 (1) was entitled to conversion to the extent of its extant permits,
although, had it merely violated a local traffic ordinance--operated "other-
wise" unlawfully, the Commission could refuse conversion. Yet it is
obvious that the intent behind these amendments was to force carriers in
the position of Contract Steel Carriers who, operating under their permits,
were not, by the Court's definition, common carriers, to convert. The
essential elements of common carrier operation intended by the amendment,
then, would appear to be activity within the scope of extant permits which,
at the same time, was non-limited as to number of contracts and which did
not display the requisite degree of assignment of vehicles or specialization.
Although the statutory language does not on its face dictate the conclusion,
the only reasonable interpretation, considering the background of the
legislation, is that all carriers whose operation within the scope of their
permits of contract carriage did not meet the new definition of contract
carrier were engaged in operations as common carriers. The third require-
ment, then, is that those operations be found also "otherwise lawful": lawful
in all regards other than carrier classification.
Of course, it again may be asked just how illegal the operations can
be before the Commission determines that they are not "otherwise lawful"
for purposes of this section. Will violation of a state weight or speed
limit be such an illegal act, or will a more significant violation be required?
Will the Commission have authority to excuse minor infractions, such as
failure to comply with a safety regulation promulgated by it? The legisla-
tive history gives no inkling of what Congress intended and the statute
speaks in absolute terms. However, since the Commission is in the best
position to evaluate the severity of the infraction, it appears preferable that
the statute be so interpreted as to leave its discretion free.49 The Commis-
sion should determine each case by balancing the nature of the infraction
and the consequences of a denial of the privilege of conversion. 0
49. Cf. Aero Motor Line, Inc., No. MC-47616 (Sub-No. 6), ICC, 1958. The
examiner found common control in the ownership of Aero, which was claiming
common carrier status and seeldng conversion, and a contract carrier serving the
same territory. Such dual ownership of a common and contract carrier is proscribed
by § 310 of the act (with exceptions not here relevant), and therefore a substantial
argument could have been made that Aero's operations were unlawful. The examiner,
however, permitted the conversion on the condition that the owners dispose of their
majority interest in one or the other company.
50. A carrier who no longer conforms to the definition of contract carriage will
have either to convert or to change his operations to conform to the new definition.
See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
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If one is found to have satisfied5 1 the above three requirements of
section 312(c), his contract carrier permit will be revoked and in lieu
thereof a certificate of public convenience and necessity will be issued., A
question remains as to what determination should be made in those cases
where the company is no longer found to be a contract carrier but has
failed to satisfy the common carrier or lawful operations requirements or
both. Certainly he cannot be converted under section 312(c). The
provisions of section 312(a) make it just as certain that his permit cannot
be revoked in the conversion proceeding.52  However, since he is no
longer complying with the provisions of the act by operation within the
restrictions of his permit, it seems clear that the Commission can now
order him to cease and desist from his illegal activity.P But if such an order
is to be made, an additional hearing on the issue of compliance with the
new statutory definition of contract carrier may be required.5
4
INCIDENTS OF A COMMON CARRIER CERTIFICATE
The most important and perplexing questions presented by the addition
of section 312(c) arise when it is determined that a carrier has met the
requirements for conversion. In such a case the Commission is to issue a
51. The statute does not designate which party will have the burden of proof in
these proceedings. It would seem preferable, as is usual in litigation, to put the
burden on the party initiating the suit.
52. 49 Stat. 555 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §312(a) (1952) provides that
no permit shall be revoked unless the holder thereof willfully fails to comply, within
a reasonable time, with an order of the Commission issued after a proper hearing,
commanding obedience to the provisions of the chapter, or to the rule or regulation
of the Commission thereunder. Cf. the leading cases of Smith Bros., 33 M.C.C. 465
(1942) ; Florence Lane, 52 M.C.C. 427 (1951). See text accompanying notes 58, 59
infra.
53. 49 Stat. 555 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §312 (a) (1952). Cf. Florence
lane, mtpra note 52, where the Commission instituted suit for failure of the permit
holder to comply with the statutory definition of contract carrier. She was given
60 days in which to effectuate the Commission's order. Failure to do so would result
in forfeiture of the permit. See also Fischbach Trucking Co., 61 M.C.C. 539 (1953).
54. The setting for such an order is as follows: A contract carrier has applied for
conversion and proves to the Commission's satisfaction that it is no longer a contract
carrier, but fails in his other proof. The question then is whether the Commission
will be permitted thereupon to issue an order under § 312(a) demanding compliance
with the statutory definition, or whether it will be required instead to afford the
carrier a second hearing on, the same issue of compliance with the act. Section 312(a)
states that the Commission's order must be made in accord with §304(c), which
makes notice and hearing of the alleged violation mandatory. It is arguable that in
the conversion proceeding the applying carrier was not given the required opportunity
to defend his contract carrier status, for, in that proceeding he was, in fact, exerting
his utmost effort to disprove such status. If the Commission or an interested party
had instituted the conversion proceedings and the contract carrier had failed in
defense of his status, the argument is of course less tenable. Tactically, however,
in either situation the argument is worth pursuing, for if the carrier can convince
the Commission of the validity of its position, it will then be free provisionally to
continue its present operations. Only after new notice has been given and a hearing
held on the alleged violation of the statutory definition will the Commission be able
to issue an order compelling obedience. Even apart from the possibility that, on
second hearing, the company may be able to satisfy the Commission that its operations
are those of a contract carrier, the time delay will, in any event, prove financially
beneficial.
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certificate authorizing "the transportation, as a common carrier, of the
same commodities between the same points or within the same territory
as authorized in the permit." It must be determined which incidents of
common carriage the converting carrier acquires. The most familiar and
basic incident of common status is the right of the carrier to "hold itself
out to the general public." 5 It is beyond dispute that the newly converted
carrier will be endowed with this right. However, there is considerable
dispute about the extent to which the carrier may demand certification to
hold itself out to the public in regard to four basic problems: dormancy,
tacking, interchange, and "keystone restrictions." There are currently
before the Commission a number of cases which raise these problems; 5
the balance of this Note will deal with their treatment under the new
statutory scheme.
Dormancy
Dormancy exists where a carrier does not operate between all the
points or does not haul all the commodities authorized in its permit. The
statutory language leaves unclear whether upon conversion the carrier's
authority should be granted in accordance with the permits it holds or
restricted to those commodities and locations actually served. The first
words that may indicate an answer are those providing that a carrier
"actually in operation" can apply for conversion. Likewise, in the require-
ments for conversion the carrier's "operations" must be found not to
conform to the new definition of contract carrier; and by implication the
"operations" must be those of a common carrier. Thus it is clear that the
carrier must be engaging in some operations, but the crucial question
whether all authority, to be converted, must be exercised in actual, active
operations is not answered. If this language is interpreted as requiring
active operations of all authorities to be converted, this interpretation would
seem to conflict with the plain meaning of the closing words of the section':
"the same commodities between the same points . . . as authorized in
the permit." = Of course, if a strict interpretation is placed on the word
"operations" in the preceeding clauses, these latter words might reasonably
be construed to comprehend only active rights included in the permit.
Since the words are apparently susceptible of two reasonable interpreta-
tions, a consideration of the method by which a right is lost aside from
conversion proceedings may provide some assistance in ascertaining con-
gressional intent.
As has previously been indicated, the rights granted by a permit may
be suspended or revoked only by following the statutory procedures as
set forth in section 312(a), which requires a hearing, an order, and an
55. 54 Stat. 920 (1940), 49 U.S.C. §303(a) (14) (1952).
56. T. T. Brooks Trucking Co., No. MC-114614 (Sub-No. 5), ICC, 1958. This
proceeding is a consolidation of ten independent applications. Argument was made
to the Commission on December 3, 1958.
57. 71 Stat. 411 (1957), 49 U.S.C. § 312(c) (Supp. V, 1958). (Emphasis added.)
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opportunity to comply with such order. This section and its applicability
to a contract carrier who is engaged in active operations but who, due to
an inability to negotiate contracts, is not fully hauling under all of its
permits, had been analyzed prior to the conversion amendments in Collins
v. Routt.5 8 In that case a competing contract carrier instituted suit to have
that portion of defendant's permit over which he was not presently perform-
ing services revoked. The evidence showed that defendant was willing to
engage in the contract carrier operations authorized by its permit, and
had equipment available with which to do so. The Commission pointed
out that not every interruption in operations warrants revocation of the
permit. And where, as here, the carrier is engaged in active operations and
is willing to serve to the full extent of his permit, the complaint should be
dismissed.
Shortly thereafter, in another pre-amendment proceeding, the Com-
mission in Florence Lane, 9 again had occasion to consider the effect of
failure to operate on the continued validity of the permit. In that case the
carrier lost all of its contracts, and experienced a complete cessation of
business. After several unsuccessful attempts to renegotiate contracts, the
owner of the permit disposed of all of her trucks and entered into a
different field of employment. The rights authorized remained com-
pletely dormant from 1940, and yet in 1951, when the Commission sought
to revoke the permit, it felt constrained to follow the statutory requirements
of notice, hearing and an opportunity to comply with Commission order;
and defendant was given sixty days to resume its operations. Thus it is
evident that an operating right's lying dormant does not, and cannot, in
and of itself, automatically cancel or revoke its effect.
The detailed procedures provided by Congress and followed by the
Commission for removing authorities formerly granted but lying dormant
indicates a reluctance lightly to curtail existing permit rights. Admittedly,
the statutory conversion provision is in the nature of a "grandfather"
clause, but it is dissimilar from the "grandfather" clauses in that the
language does not specifically require the certificate granted to be limited
to the extent of the actual bona fide operations of the carrier prior to the
time of conversion.60 In light of the reluctance to revoke for dormancy and
the fact that Congress has elsewhere clearly limited "grandfather" rights to
actual operations when that was its intent, it seems more reasonable that
Congress here intended no abridgment of full permit authority.6 1 Certainly,
58. 51 M.C.C. 218 (1950).
59. 52 M.C.C. 427 (1951).
60. See, for example, the grandfather clauses of the original Motor Carrier Act,
49 Stat. 551 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §306(a)(1) (1952), and 49 Stat. 552
(1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §309(a) (1) (1952), and that of the Water Carrier
Act, 54 Stat. 941 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 909(a) (1952).
61. This result was reached by the examiner in T. T. Brooks Trucking Co.,
No. MC-114614 (Sub-No. 5), ICC, 1958. See also Emery Transp. Co., No. MC-9685
(Sub-No. 58), ICC, 1958. But where status conversion is sought upon proof of public
convenience and necessity it has been suggested that the carrier should be required to
surrender its dormant rights. Fischbach Trucking Co., 61 M.C.C. 539 (1953).
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in the absence of more explicit expression of a contrary intent, currently
extant rights should not be foreclosed.
Common carriers may argue that to allow this result will subject them
to competition over routes and in commodities where they had no competi-
tion before conversion. The converting carriers, however, did in fact have
authority to serve these areas and to haul these commodities before the
amendment; and their authority could be removed only through procedures
including opportunity, on order, to negotiate contracts and commence car-
riage. Having these valid authorities the converters were free to compete on
their own initiative; to restrict this freedom now would result both in a less-
ening of potentially available competition and in a removal of existing rights
of the converting carrier. Neither the legislative history nor the statute itself
indicate any intent on the part of Congress so to deprive the converters of
territorial or commodity rights.
6 2
Tacking
Tacking is a practice which enables a carrier who holds an authority to
transport commodities between points A and B and another authority to
transport commodities between points B and C to combine or "tack" such
authorities and offer a through service between A and C as well as service
between A and B or B and C respectively.
It is beyond dispute that common carriers are permitted to tack.6
The essential requirements for tacking 6 4 are: (1) that there be a point of
service common to both operating authorities; (2) that the physical opera-
tions actually pass through such point;8 (3) that the character of the
authorized service (either regular or irregular route) under each authority
be preserved; and (4) that the authorities sought to be tacked be separate.6
62. See text accompanying note 3 and note 34 supra.
63. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Lenzmeier, Inc., 66 M.C.C. 615 (1956);
Fleetlines, Inc. v. Arrowhead Freight Lines, Ltd., 54 M.C.C. 279 (1952); Donald
B. Zirbel, 53 M.C.C. 684 (1951); Aetna Freight Lines, Inc., 48 M.C.C. 610 (1948).
In the Aetna case the Commission said that the right to tack is available irrespective
of whether the separate authorities were acquired under the "grandfather" clause, by
purchase, merger, or in proceedings under §307(a) of the act. Id. at 611.
64. These requirements are set forth in the cases cited note 63 supra.
65. The Commission can be very exacting in this requirement. Thus in M. I.
O'Boyle & Son v. ICC, 206 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1953), the Commission enjoined
the carrier from tacking for failure to operate through the common point. The point
happened to be the military base at Boiling Field. But cf. Missouri-Pac. Transp. Co.,
41 M.C.C. 545 (1942). For an interesting illustration of the effect of this require-
ment see Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Lenzmeier, 66 M.C.C. 615 (1956), where
the carrier was permitted to tack, although in doing so his prescribed route became
quite circuitous. Cf. Creston Transfer Co., 73 M.C.C. 645 (1957) (tacking prohibited
where it would result in substantial circuity).
66. Where rights sought to be combined were acquired through purchase, merger,
or separate application under §307(a) (wherein proof of public convenience and
necessity is required) the authorities are considered separate and may be tacked.
See Byers Transp. Co. v. United States, 49 F. Supp. 828 (D.C. Mo. 1943); Aetna
Freight Lines, Inc., 48 M.C.C. 610, 611 (1948). But if the rights sought to be tacked
were issued in a single proceeding, it then is a question of the Commission's intent
at the time of issuance, as to whether separate authorities or a single authority, was
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Applying these requirements to the A, B, C example above, the carrier
would be able to render service between A and C only so long as in doing
so he passes through B, and travels over regular or irregular routes as
authorized in his certificates.
The Commission has consistently treated tacking as a permissive right
of the common carrier, one which the Commission may in its discretion
expressly proscribe. Thus in Direct Transport Co.,6 7 the Commission
affirmed an order of the joint board prohibiting the carrier from tacking
directly or indirectly the new grant with any other held by the company.
It stated:
"There is no merit to . . . the . . . contention that a restriction
against joinder of an authority granted herein with its existing rights
is improper. The right of a carrier to operate over all combinations of
its operating rights unless specifically restricted in its certificate is
well settled. Our right, however, to impose restrictions against
joinder where warranted, is equally well established ...
It is not the Commission's practice, however, to limit a carrier's tacking
privilege, and normally it does so only when it considers that a substantial
reason exists. Thus in the Direct Transport case the newly authorized
route was granted "for convenience only," the carrier already operating
between the designated points under an intrastate grant. The Commission
pointed out that neither new services nor opportunity to work an adverse
effect on the operations of other carriers was contemplated. In light of
these statements and the fact that the applicant held connecting authorities
in twenty-four other states, it was felt the circumstances warranted a
restriction against joinder.6 9 But where no reason is presented to restrict
a carrier's right to tack, he will be permitted to do so. Thus even where a
carrier in an extension proceeding offered but vague and indefinite evidence
of a need for the through service resulting if his newly granted authority
were tacked, the Commission said: "Unless there is some valid reason for
so restricting an operating authority it has not been our practice to do so." 70
granted. If it is determined that a single authority was granted, the "separate au-
thorities" rule is invoked, and routes authorized may not be tacked. See Donald B.
Zirbel, 53 M.C.C. 684 (1951). Cf. G. & M. Motor Transfer Co., 43 M.C.C. 497
(1944); Jack Cole Co., 41 M.C.C. 657 (1942). Where, upon proof of public con-
venience and necessity, a contract carrier converts his operations into those of a
common carrier, he can subsequently tack, for the conversion is said not to effect a
consolidation of the prior separate contract authorities into a single grant. Roy
Beem, 66 M.C.C. 259 (1955).
67. 68 M.C.C. 151 (1956).
68. Id. at 156-57. See also Creston Transfer Co., 73 MlvC.C. 645 (1947) and
L. B. Vincent Gardella, 71 M.C.C. 791 (1957).
69. Direct Transp. Co., 68 M.C.C. 151, 156-57 (1957). Similarly the tacking
restriction in Creston Transfer Co., 73 M.C.C. 645 (1957), was based on substantial
circuity in routes which would obtain if the authorities were combined.
70. Miller Motor Line, 66 M.C.C. 529, 534 (1956).
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Since there was no evidence that the tacking would produce any material
adverse effects on existing carriers, no restriction was imposed.
71
In contrast to common carriers it is similarly quite clear that contract
carriers cannot tack. 2 The theory behind such limitation is twofold. First,
contract carriers were and are to be granted permits only where they are
performing a specialized service or serving the peculiar needs of particular
shippers; 73 and, second, the Commission is authorized by section 309(b)
to specify in the permit "the business of the contract carrier covered thereby
and the scope thereof. . . ." 74 This clause was said to be all-inclusive
and to connote "the exact and precise character of the service to be rendered
by such carrier." "5 Thus each permit fully describes the service to be
rendered and tacking would create an authority inconsistent with such
particularization.
In conversion application proceedings currently before the Commission
the issue has been raised whether the converting carriers shall be allowed
to tack. 0 Again legislative history is lacking and the statutory language
is ambiguous, providing, on the one hand, for authority, "between the same
points or within the same territory as authorized in the permit," and, on
the other, for issuance of a certificate "as a common carrier." There are
three alternative constructions which can be placed upon these words: (1)
that no tacking whatever can be authorized; (2) that an absolute right to
tack, as ordinarily incident to common carrier status, is granted by the
statute, ipso facto, to all carriers meeting the conversion requirements; or
(3) that the Commission may, in its discretion, determine for each in-
dividual case whether or not to authorize tacking, just as it does in the case
of an original application for a certificate of common carriage.
77
71. Miller Motor Line, 66 M.C.C. 529 (1956). This view has been iterated in
Eldon Miller Inc., 73 M.C.C. 538 (1957), and Liquid Transporters, Inc., MC-112617
(Sub-No. 26), ICC, June 13, 1958. See also Transportation Corp. of Va., 43 M.C.C.
716 (1944).
72. The leading case is T. B. Longshore, 43 M.C.C. 755 (1944). See also Emery
Transp. Co. v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 644 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd per curiam, 339
U.S. 955 (1950) ; Service of Contract Carriers, 49 M.C.C. 103 (1949).
73. Such were the Commission standards before Contract Steel; such are statutory
standards after the subsequent amendments.
74. 71 Stat. 411 (1957), 49 U.S.C. §309(b) (Supp. V, 1958).
75. T. B. Longshore, 43 M.C.C. 755, 759 (1944). See also Noble v. United
States, 319 U.S. 88 (1943); Simon McAteer, 42 M.C.C. 35 (1943).
76. T. T. Brooks Trucking Co., No. MC-114614 (Sub-No. 5), ICC, 1958,
argued before the Commission as a whole December 3, 1958.
77. It is arguable that there is no statutory authority for Commission power to
restrict certificates issued in conversion proceedings. The cases heretofore cited to
support the position that the Commission has authority to place restrictions on a
carrier's right to tack (notes 67, 68 supra) were all extension cases, and, while not
so stated, were apparently based on § 308. This section provides that the Commission
shall, as public convenience and necessity dictate, impose terms, conditions and limita-
tions, including those as to the extension of routes. The contention can be made
that on a strict grammatical reading § 308 is self-limiting to certificates issued under
§§306 and 307, and therefore not applicable to certificates issued under §312(c).
Since no other section of the Motor Carrier Act grants similar authority to the
Commission it would follow that these converting carriers are beyond its control in
this aspect. The very drastic nature of this result would indicate that, if § 308 be
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The second alternative, an absolute right to tack, seems little in
accord with the statutory intent. In effect, the conversion proceedings are
a recognition that certain carriers are de facto common carriers according
to the Commission's long established understanding of the distinction.
The conversion proceeding is an attempt to give these carriers de jure
status and to make the Commission's distinction statutorily operative. But
to grant these converting carriers opportunity automatically to secure more
advantageous rights than have existing common carriers, who are subject
to express restriction of the tacking privilege at Commission discretion,
would appear unwise. On the other hand, an absolute prohibition of tacking
would appear no more consistent with Congressional intent. Congress
designated conversion into a "common carrier," not a new type of carrier,
such as, for example, a "converting contract-common carrier." Is Since
the carrier's duties upon conversion are the same as those of other public
carriers, it may be argued, so, too, their rights should be equivalent. Nor
should the Commission be hampered in its power to promote transportation
arrangements in furtherance of the public interest.
However, since the language is susceptible of several interpretations,
and since the legislative history indicates a complete unawareness of this
problem, these conclusions bear further analysis. The fact that a contract
carrier has received each separate grant of authority merely upon a show-
ing of consistency with the public interest,70 that each authority had origi-
nally been granted under Commission understanding that it stood alone
and could not be tacked,80 and that by permitting tacking the carrier would
be given additional rights (of potentially great value) with no showing of
public convenience and necessity, argues for at least some check upon, or
potential limitation of, the tacking privilege. 8' However, it is equally true
that Congress provided generally for conversion into common status and
rights precisely without proof of public convenience and necessity, that
the understanding of the contract carriers upon conversion to common
carrier status (under section 307) was that tacking would be permissible,
8 2
and that common carriers themselves, under the latest rulings of the
held not to authorize limitations on all certificates of common. carriage issued under
§ 312(c), Congress might well act immediately to give the Commission such authority.
However, it is not likely that contract carriers will pursue this argument, for if it is
successful, so that upon conversion carriers are not subject to control of the Com-
mission under the explicit words of the statute, then, indeed, it will have been held
that Congress did intend to create a third and distinct type of carrier. In such a case
the Court no doubt will assume control over these carriers, and presumably will apply
the same rules as would the Commission. Cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
78. A standard rule of statutory construction is that "The repetition of the defi-
nition without material change in the subsequent acts . . . amounts to a confirmation
of the administrative interpretation.' McFeely v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 102, 108
(1935).
79. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
80. See text accompanying notes 72-75 supra.
81. This argument was used by the examiner in T. T. Brooks Trucking Co.,
No. MC-114614 (Sub-No. 5), ICC, 1958.
82. Roy Beem, 66 M.C.C. 259 (1955).
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Commission, need not, and often do not, prove that public convenience and
necessity will be served by the combining of their separate authorities.8
And although, if tacking is permitted, the converting carrier will receive
greater territorial rights than he previously had,8 4 this argument is reduced
in effect when it is considered that even if tacking is permitted the convert-
ing carriers will not have territorial rights any greater than those ordinarily
enjoyed by other common carriers holding similar certificates.
In assessing these arguments, consideration should be given to the
effect that authorizing tacking will have upon competition, for one of the
major policies of the Interstate Commerce Act is to "foster sound economic
conditions . . . among the several carriers." 85 If tacking is permitted,
the converting carrier will be able to offer complete service between points
he was not previously authorized to serve. Virtually all business he receives
over this new authority will of necessity be at the expense of the other
carriers serving the area. Certainly it is not inconceivable that, in some
instances, to permit this new and heretofore unknown form of competition
will impair the operations of existent common carriers. Such a result
would be directly contrary to the policy of the act 8 6 and to the standard
practice of the Commission. 7
Rather, the most acceptable alternative would appear to be to allow
tacking only subject to the standard considerations which the Commission
applies in any case in which a carrier seeks tacking rights.88 Thus, in
situations where there is material objection, such as circuity of the com-
bined route,8 9 or impairment of operations of other carriers," express
83. See notes 70, 71 supra and accompanying text.
84. Cf. Emery Transp. Co., No. MC-9685 (Sub-No. 58), ICC, 1958.
85. The National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. preceding
§1 (1952).
86. The National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. pre-
ceding § 1 (1952). In Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83 (1957),
the Court said that this policy was "the yardstick by which the correctness of the
Commission's actions will be measured." Id. at 88. Cf. Adams, Tte Role of Corn-
petition in, the Regulated Industries, 48 Ar. EcoN. REv. 527 (1958), where it is
strongly suggested that freer competition in the motor carrier industry would produce
much more satisfactory results.
87. Thus, an application for a certificate or a permit will be denied if the new
service would impair the stability of other carriers. See, e.g., Clarke v. United States,
101 F. Supp. 587 (D.D.C. 1951); T.S.C. Motor Freight Lines, 62 M.C.C. 499 (1954).
For a case illustrating the extreme extent to which' the Commission will carry this
doctrine see B & F Bus Serv., Inc., 53 M.C.C. 501 (1951). But where competition
will not be impaired, the certificate will be granted. Cf. Alexandria, Barcroft &
Wash. Transit Co. v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Va. 1951); Capital
Transit Co. v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 614 (D.D.C. 1951).
88. This case-by-case determination appears to be the approach of the examiners
in Aero Motor Line, Inc., MC-47616 (Sub-No. 5), ICC, 1958, and Michigan Transp.
Co., MC-52078 (Sub-No. 15), ICC, 1958. In both cases no material basis for re-
stricting tacking was found, and therefore tacking was permitted.
89. Creston Transfer Co., 73 M.C.C. 645 (1957).
90. Adverse competitive effects were considered adequate reason to restrict tack-
ing in several cases decided by the Commission before the conversion amendments.
The Commission so held in cases where the combined rights were created by purchase.
Shein's Express, 56 M.C.C. 711 (1950), appeal dismissed, 102 F. Supp. 320 (D.NJ.
1951). See also Falwell v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 71 (W.D. Va. 1947), aff'd
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restrictions against tacking would be imposed at the Commission's discre-
tion. But if no substantial reason against tacking is raised,.1 the Commis-




In conversion proceedings the issue has been raised whether the
converting carrier will be permitted to interchange. a Interchange is that
practice whereby connecting carriers "combine" their separate authorities
to offer a through service between distant points. The combination is
effectuated at a common point either through the exchange of loaded
vehicles or by transferring the passengers or property from one carrier's
vehicles to those of the other carrier. Common carriers by motor vehicle
are required by law to provide through service and joint rates for
passengers,9 4 and they may, if they will, do the same in the transport of
property.
per curian, 330 U.S. 807 (1947); E. W. King, 60 M.C.C. 331, 353-54 (1954). The
Comnission has indicated a similar attitude in one case of acquisition of new licenses
upon proof of public convenience and necessity. Direct Transp. Co., 68 M.C.C. 151
(1956).
91. The statute provides for the intervention of "interested parties" in hearings
held by the Commission. 49 Stat. 550 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 305(e) (1952).
Cf. Alton R.R. v. United States, 315 U.S. 15 (1942) (competing railroad given
standing to sue to set aside an. order of the ICC granting a motor carrier certificate
of public convenience and necessity) ; Interstate Common Carrier Council v. United
States, 84 F. Supp. 414 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiam, 338 U.S. 843 (1949). It has
often been pointed out that the Commission has been very lenient in permitting inter-
vention by parties having only a minute interest in a particular proceeding. See,
e.g., Guelzo, Tlw Interstate Commerce Commission and Common Sense, 25 ICC PRAc.
J. 388, 393 (1958).
92. Somewhat similar issues as to dormancy and tacking arise under § 5 (2) (b)
of the act. This section provides that it shall be lawful, with the Commission's
approval, for two or more carriers to consolidate or merge their operations provided
that the Commission finds that the proposed transaction "will be consistent with the
public interest." 54 Stat. 906 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (b) (1952). Problems in
these areas have been thoroughly analyzed. See Fulda, Antitrust Considerations in
Motor Carrier Mergers, 56 Mica. L. REv. 1237, 1263-81 (1958); Burstein, Motor
Carrier Acquisitims, Mergers and Consolidations, 24 ICC PRAc. J. 375 (1957). They
arise chiefly where a carrier seeks to purchase or merge dormant rights of another
carrier, or where connecting authorities are sought to be unified. In the former case
the purchasing carrier buys with the obvious intent to utilize the authority, and so
create an additional competitive power. The cases collected indicate that where this
will result in material adverse effect on competition the application will be denied.
A similar test is applied in the determination of applications for unification of con-
necting authorities; a major consideration is the probable effect on the continuance,
efficiency, and economy of existing carrier service. Where the two carriers have
been interchanging, the adverse effect, of course, will be much less than where there
was little or no interchange between consolidating companies.
These decisions do not speak directly to the § 312 problem since, as has been
noted, § 5(2) (b) provides that approval be conditioned upon consistency with the
public interest. Moreover, this statute has been viewed as granting broader authority
and greater administrative discretion than almost any other section of the act. Cf.
0. C. Wiley & Sons v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 542 (W.D. Va.), aff'd per curuam,
338 U.S. 902 (1949); Virginia Stage Lines v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 79, 82
(W.D. Va. 1942).
93. T. T. Brooks Trucking Co., No. MC-114614 (Sub-No. 5), ICC, 1958.
94. 49 Stat 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 316(a) (1952). Railroads and airlines have
a similar obligation both as to passengers and freight. See 24 Stat. 379 (1887), 49
U.S.C. § 1(4) (1952), and 54 Stat. 71235 (1940), 49 U.S.C. §484 (1952).
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Permissive authority to interchange property cargo is set out in section
316(c) which provides that: "Common carriers of property by motor
vehicle may establish reasonable through routes and joint rates, charges,
and classification with other such carriers. . . ,"95 The Commission,
however, has interpreted this section as not precluding the imposition of
administrative restrictions on interchange.9 6 The Commission reasons
that Congress would have specifically stated any intent on its part to
prohibit the ICC from imposing such limitations; in the absence of specific
statement, Congress must have intended the Commission to limit inter-
change when it considered limitation necessary in the public interest.9 7
This interpretation has never been questioned in the courts, but at the
least it is subject to considerable doubt. The language provides that a
common carrier "may" interchange property, and is entirely consistent
with an interpretation that the only limitations imposed are by the carrier's
own discretion. Yet the Commission's construction stands and must be
reckoned with until a court has decided the question.
But the mere fact that the Commission has assumed authority to
prohibit interchange in proper circumstances does not of itself justify the
imposition of such a restriction here. Rather, in resolving this issue, the
practice of contract carriers in utilizing interchange or its equivalent must
be considered.
It is no longer questioned that contract carriers cannot interchange. 8
However it is similarly no longer questioned that they can achieve the
same result by use of an agency device. The Commission has suggested that
in negotiating a contract to transport goods, the parties also may negotiate
a separate agency agreement wherein the contract carrier acting not as a
carrier but rather for his principal, the shipper, either arranges for trans-
portation beyond points to which it is authorized to carry, or receives goods
from like points where it has no authority. By so doing a technical inter-
vention of the shipper (or consignee) by his agent is said to have occurred,
which "bona fide delivery" to him is adequate to break the through service. 99
95. 49 Stat. 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §316(c) (1951). See Century-Matthews
Motor Freight, Inc. v. Thurn, 173 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1949). Cf. Lubbock-El Paso
Motor Freight, Inc., 27 M.C.C. 585, 591 (1941), where the Commission said "Inter-
change is a service connected with transportation. We think that 'service,' when
applied to . . .motor-carrier operations, contemplates interchange with connecting
carriers . . . ." See also Daniels v. Rose, 43 M.C.C. 726 (1944) ; Planters Nut &
Chocolate Co. v. American Transfer Co., 31 M.C.C. 719, 729 (1942).
96. T. T. Brooks Trucking Co., No. MC-114614 (Sub-No. 5), ICC, 1958, at 8,
quoting Mead, No. MC-64110, ICC, Jan. 16, 1956. Accord, C & D Transp. Co.,
No. MC-109326 (Sub-No. 69), ICC, 1956, cited in 4 KNoRsr, INTESSrATE COiM ERCn
LAW AND PRAcncE 2133 (1958). Cf. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 67 M.C.C. 457
(1956); Blain Driveaway System, Inc., 62 M.C.C. 109 (1953).
97. See Mead, stupra note 96; C & D Transp. Co., supra note 96.
98. Service of Contract Carriers, 49 M.C.C. 103 (1949). See also Movement of
Highway Trailers by Rail, 293 I.C.C. 93, 108 (1954). The theory behind the pro-
scription is apparently based in part upon the same reasoning invoked to justify
proscription of tacking. See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
99. In Service of Contract Carriers, 49 M.C.C. 103 (1949), the Commission
advocated this procedure to enable contract carriers to get around the no-interchange
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To satisfy the legal form separate contracts are made both with the contract
carrier in his dual capacity and with all other participating carriers.1°0
This distinction is not as inconsistent as it may seem. The concern of the
Commission has been not with the establishment of through service but
rather with the form in which it is done. If two carriers qua carriers are
permitted to interchange there are differences in the making of rates which
the Commission felt the statute prohibited.10 1 On the other hand, when the
contract carrier acts as a private individual, these problems can be entirely
resolved, while still providing through service to the shipper.
Where the converting carrier has been making active use of the
agency device to achieve de facto interchange privileges, there seems little
reason to deny it the full common interchange right upon conversion. At
least to the extent of the carriage authorized by its permit, it has already
established a commercial practice and a competitive status based upon
interchange practice. Where common carriage is involved, the reasons
for requiring the technical agency device no longer exist, and there is no
justification for requiring the converting carrier to continue use of a
meaningless form. Moreover, even where it has not formerly participated
in such activity, the carrier has a strong argument for the interchange right.
While admittedly it may not so far have exploited this form of competition,
the agency scheme has always been fully available to it and could have
been utilized at will to impair the operations of competing carriers.
0 2
Permitting interchange by the converting carrier would, it is true, mean
that the process involved in providing through service was less complicated;
and an expanded volume of traffic probably incident upon the transition
to common service would allow the carrier increased utilization of both the
old privilege and the new facility. The carrier's competitive status would
improve to that extent. And it is arguable that the effect of permitting
rule. The device is used to accomplish an effectual interchange with not only other
contract carriers but also with common carriers by motor vehicle and with railroads.
See Atkinson, Inc., 61 LC.C. 390 (1952); Movement of Highway Trailers by Rail,
293 I.C.C. 93 (1954).
100. See cases cited note 99 supra.
101. There is no statutory language permitting contract carriers to publish such
schedules of through rates as would be required if interchange were permitted. By
the agency device through rates are avoided. Service of Contract Carriers, 49 M.C.C.
103, 104-05 (1949).
102. A similar argument was presented in the discussion of the issue of dormancy,
note 62 supra. Cf. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Lenzmeier,Inc., 66 M.C.C. 615
(1956). This result is concurred in by the examiners in Emery Transp. Co., No.
MC-9685 (Sub-No. 58), ICC, 1958; T. T. Brooks Trucking Co., No. MC-114614
(Sub-No. 5), ICC, 1958. In the former proceeding the examiner reasoned that the
act indicated no intention to create "second-class common carriers." Emery Transp.
Co., mtpra, at 12. In the latter case the examiner apparently was trying to achieve
an equitable result. Since, upon conversion, the heretofore contract carrier would
no longer be permitted to discriminate in price and service, it might thereby lose some
traffic, and, by allowing interchange, the examiner felt that ample compensation could
be had. As further support, he noted that in permitting interchange no enlargement
of the actual physical operations of the carrier would occur. In contrast, he said, if
tacking were permitted, such enlargement would result. T. T. Brooks Trucking Co.,
supra, at 23. See also Aero Motor Line, Inc., No. MC-47616 (Sub-No. 15), ICC,
1958; Michigan Transp. Co., No. MC-52978 (Sub-No. 15), ICC, 1958.
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interchange, in terms of harm to competing carriers, is as great or greater
than that of permitting tacking: although a carrier with several authorities
may not be able to tack them for want of a common point, the same carrier
can extend its services by interchanging goods shipped over any of those
authorities, and thus affect competitors to a much greater degree. It
could be contended, then, that, if a material adverse effect upon competition
is enough to warrant restriction on tacking, a similar effect of interchange
warrants similar restriction. But the argument applies to interchange, of
course, only insofar as the speculative increase in volume of carriage is
actualized, for only to this extent does the converting carrier acquire
competitive advantages not already at hand in the agency device. And
since, under Contract Steel, 13 the same carrier had almost unlimited power
of expansion, so long as it remained within its permit limitations, the only
new opportunity for increase of volume business which conversion allows
is authority to advertise generally for public service. 1 4 But this advantage
seems more than offset by the carrier's new duty to maintain a published
tariff rate; it has lost the flexibility of specific bidding.0 5 Saddled with the
new obligations of common carriage, it should have whatever advantage the
usual common carrier's incident of interchange may bring. Nor does the
ambiguity of the statute noted in the discussion of tacking present itself
here. Although permitted interchange, the carrier does not extend its
service beyond the individual points previously designated in its permit
and thus, even on a most literal reading, remains within the statutory
conversion grant. 0
The "Keystone" Restriction
Thus far discussion of the incidents of the new certificates of common
carriage has focused on the statutory words "between the same points."
The consideration shifts to the words "the same commodities" when the
"keystone" restriction is at issue. The "keystone" restriction, placed in a
contract carrier's permit, limits the carrier to certain types of shippers.
Thus, while the permit may designate a wide variety of commodities, the
carrier is effectively limited. It must be determined whether upon conver-
sion the carrier will still be so limited, or will be permitted to haul the
same commodities for all shippers.
The "keystone" restriction originated in a proceeding under the
grandfather clause of the 1935 act,'07 wherein Keystone Transportation Co.
had made application for a permit. Its operations prior to federal regula-
tion of the industry had been limited to serving all the shipping needs of
103. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
104. This assumes that conversion does not also operate to annul "keystone"
restrictions. See text accompanying notes 107-25 infra.
105. See text accompanying notes 12, 19 supra.
106. Cf. T. T. Brooks Trucking Co., No. MC-114614 (Sub-No. 5), ICC, 1958.
107. 49 Stat. 552 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §309(a) (1952).
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chain grocery and food store. The Commission, in granting its authority,
allowed it to continue hauling the same wide variety of commodities 108
but limited its service to only those classes of shippers. 0 9 Similar limita-
tion of a "grandfather" carrier was tested in Noble v. United States."0
The Supreme Court noted that section 309(b) authorized the Commission
to specify in the description of the permissible operations authorized by
the permit the "business . . . covered thereby and the scope thereof." l
The Court said:
"An accurate definition [of the services rendered] frequently can be
made only in terms of the type or class of shippers served. Unless
the words of the Act are given that interpretation, permits under the
'grandfather' clause may greatly distort the prior activities of the
carrier. He who was in substance a highly specialized carrier for a
select few would be treated as a carrier of general commodities for
all comers, merely because he had carried a wide variety of articles.
. . . The 'grandfather' clause would be utilized not to preserve the
portion which the carrier had obtained in the nation's transportation
system, but to enlarge and expand the business beyond the pattern
which it had acquired prior [to regulation]." 112
Shortly after Noble the Commission reaffirmed its position in Simon
McAteer,"l3 and made it quite clear that the limitation was designed to
connote the "exact and precise character" 114 of the service previously
rendered and now authorized to be rendered.
The imposition of this restriction, as has been noted, is authorized
by section 309(b),ii and is applicable only to contract carriers. Therefore,
whether the "keystone" limitation will remain valid when such carriers
convert to common is open to question. By definition a common carrier
is one who holds itself out to the general public.'" A limitation permitting
a common carrier to serve only a designated class of shippers, rather than
the public generally, would be contrary to the very concept of the class.
As the Commission said in Barnett Trucking Co.,"i7 where the applicability
108. The shipping needs of such carriers have been said to include not only food,
fruits, meats, and dairy products, but also small household goods and miscellaneous
store needs like laundry, waste and plant supplies. See Simon McAteer, 42 M.C.C.
35 (1943).
109. Keystone Transp. Co., 19 M.C.C. 475 (1939).
110. 319 U.S. 88 (1943).
111. Act of Aug. 9, 1935, ch. 498, §209(b), 49 Stat. 552, as amended (now 71
Stat. 411 (1957), 49 U.S.C. §309(b) (Supp. V, 1958)).
112. 319 U.S. 88, 9i, 92 (1943).
113. 42 M.C.C. 35 (1943).
114. Id. at 42.
115. 71 Stat. 411 (1957), 49 U.S.C. §309(b) (Supp. V, 1958).
116. 54 Stat. 920 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 303(a) (14) (1952).
117. 41 M.C.C. 303 (1942).
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of a similar "keystone" restriction was in question: "We cannot, consistently
with applicant's common-carrier status, restrict its service to particular
shippers . 18... I's
However, common carriers are subject to commodity classifications,"19
and have on occasion received certificates effectually limiting their opera-
tions in a manner very similar to the "keystone" restriction. In C. & H.
Transp. Co.'m a certificate authorizing transportation of "contractors'
equipment and supplies" was interpreted as a commodity limitation rather
than a limitation on the type of shipper. However, as such it limited the
carrier to the transportation of goods intended to be used by contractors.
The Commission explained that in identifying the commodities authorized
to be transported it sometimes is impractical to name them specifically, or
to use the generic or class term. In such instances the Commission identi-
fies the commodity authorized by reference to its future use. By so doing
it can enable the carrier to provide a complete service to a given industry
without at the same time giving it an unlimited commodity authorization.
Thus the Commission found in C. & H. Transp. Co. that the carrier, by
hauling equipment for the government rather than a contractor, was acting
beyond its certificate.'
2 '
The statutory language provides that the converting carrier is author-
ized to haul "the same commodities," as he did under his permit. Since,
technically, the "keystone" restriction is considered a limitation on shippers
118. Id. at 306. This case involved an application under the grandfather clause.
The carrier had transported general commodities, but limited his services to the
needs of freight forwarders. Protestants sought to continue limitation of his service
to these shippers. The Commission refused to do so. See also Exhibitors Film De-
livery & Serv. Co., 67 M.C.C. 613 (1956) ; J. Frank Dowd, 47 M.C.C. 69 (1947).
Cf. Farm to Market Carriers, Inc. v. Elliot, 67 M.C.C. 358 (1956); Anton Vidas,
62 M.C.C. 106 (1953); Francis W. Sanders, 47 M.C.C. 210 (1947). These cases
involve common carrier certificates describing commodities authorized to be carried
in terms of a type of shipper, but have been interpreted as limiting the carrier only
in the type of goods hauled. Thus, in the Farm case the certificate authorized the
carriage of "such merchandise as is dealt in by retail hardware stores." The carrier
was permitted to haul such merchandise as would be stocked in a hardware store,
without regard to the business of the customer.
119. 49 Stat. 546 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §304(b) (1952). This section
provides that: "The Commission may . . . establish such . . . reasonable classi-
fications of . . . groups of carriers included in the term 'common carrier by motor
vehicle' . . . as the special nature of the services performed by such carriers . . .
shall require . .. ."
120. 62 M.C.C. 586 (1954). This reasoning has been used to justify elimination
of the "keystone" restriction upon conversion. Cf. Fischbach Trucking Co., 61 M.C.C.
539 (1953).
121. 62 M.C.C. 586 (1954). See L. Nelson & Sons Transp. Co., 62 M.C.C. 271
(1953), where, to enable the carrier to offer a complete service without at the same
time opening the door for carrier competition in other fields, the Commission issued
a certificate with the following commodity description: "Material ued in the manu-
facture of cloth . . . and supplies and materials used in connection with the . . .
processing of these commodities when moving too or from places of processing!' Id.
at 282. (Emphasis added.) See also Hide & Skins Transp. Co., 60 M.C.C. 657
(1957). For cases of contract carriers limited by similar commodity restrictions see
Andrew G. Nelson, Inc. v. United States, 355 U.S. 554 (1958); Dart Transit Co.,
49 M.C.C. 607 (1949); England Transp. Co., 49 M.C.C. 567 (1949).
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to be served, and not on the commodities to be hauled,'122 it would appear
that the converting carrier might be given a certificate unlimited in this
respect.'m  However, blindly accepting such a literal interpretation over-
looks the very purpose of the "keystone" restriction. It was designed to
accurately and precisely define what the carrier was doing, just as was the
commodity restriction limiting common shipments to a particular user.
To eliminate the "keystone" restriction would be to enable the converting
carrier to engage in the transportation of a wide variety of commodities
for all shippers and thereby to engage in the very types of competition
which the restriction was originally imposed to ban. Moreover, if the
check were now eliminated and the carrier let free to serve all shippers of
the authorized commodities, an entirely new and unforeseen competitive
force would arise. With virtually unlimited commodity authority it could
materially damage existing carriers.
It may be questioned whether an absolute rule should control in this
area, or whether the determination should not be made rather on a case-
by-case procedure, as with tacking. An absolute limitation for all carriers
would seem preferable. A keystone restriction limiting a contract carrier
to serving "chain grocery stores," is in point of fact exactly similar to a
commodity limitation restricting a common carrier to "chain grocery stores'
needs." Either would be violated if the carrier hauled merchandise dealt in
by grocery stores for one other than a grocery store.124 Since the statute
authorizes the converting carrier to haul only "the same commodities"
authorized in the permit, and since the "keystone" restriction is in effect
precisely a restriction on the commodities a carrier may haul, it should be
continued in effect upon all converting carriers formerly subject to the
limitation- 2 5 If expansion of the scope of a carrier's activities, such as is
likely to alter the entire nature of its services and to constitute it a new
competitive factor in the transport market, is desired, such expansion
would seem to demand the usually requisite showing of public convenience
and necessity. Manifestly, the conversion procedure was not designed to
do that job.
CONCLUSIONS
It would appear that haste to abrogate the rule of Contract Steel re-
sulted in congressional failure to examine carefully some of the broader
implications of the amendment it passed. Appeal to express legislative
intent is unhelpful for resolution of the serious constructional problems that
122. In both Noble Transit Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 88 (1943), and Simon
McAteer, 42 M.C.C. 35 (1943), Court and Commission made quite clear that the
"keystone" restriction was separate and distinct from a commodity restriction. But
see Andrew G. Nelson, Inc. v. United States, 355 U.S. 554 (1958).
123. This conclusion was reached in Emery Transp. Co., No. MC-9685 (Sub-No.
58), ICC, 1958. The examiner said that the restriction operated to limit the carrier's
contractual power to a particular type or class of persons. Id. at 11.
124. Compare Simon McAteer, 42 M.C.C. 35 (1943), with C. & H. Transp. Co.,
62 M.C.C. 586 (1954).
125. This result was reached in T. T. Brooks Trucking Co., No. MC-114614
(Sub-No. 5), ICC, 1958.
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arise, both as to the conditions required of a permit-holder for conversion
under the section and as to the several incidents of post-conversion status
of the qualified converting carrier.
In regard to problems of interpretation regarding the statutory
requirements for conversion, it seems most reasonable to conclude that
the date on which the carrier's operations must have been those of a common
carrier, and otherwise lawful, should be August 22, 1957; that operation
as a common carrier means all operation within the scope of existing
permits that fails to meet the new definition of contract carriage; and that
what kinds and degrees of illegal activity should be sufficient for denial
of conversion are matters for the sound discretion of the Commission in
individual cases.
As to which, if any, of the normal incidents of common carrier status
conversion is intended to confer, analysis must be guided both by the
overall legislative aim to preserve to the converting carrier whatever
authority consistent with its new position is most nearly equivalent to the
rights already possessed under its contract carriage permits, and by con-
sideration of the effect of extending those rights upon the competitive
structure of the transport industry.
In light of specific statutory provision controlling revocation of rights,
and the language authorizing the converting carriers to haul "between the
same points . . . as authorized in the permit," it appears preferable to
conclude that the certificate issued will include all dormant rights held
by the converting carrier, the more so in that these lie wholly within the
armory of its pre-conversion power.
Tacking privileges, on the other hand, may constitute a new and
previously unknown competitive weapon capable of working substantial
adverse effect upon the operations of existing common carriers, and,
inasmuch as the propriety of granting such privileges to the former contract
carriers has never yet been subjected to Commission scrutiny, the amend-
ment should not be construed as ipso facto conferring rights to tack.
Rather, the Commission, in its issue of the new certificate, should be free
to apply those standards which it has developed in cases of application ab
initio for common carrier certification, and, in its discretion, to extend
or expressly proscribe the tacking right. Thus, all the protection is achieved
which would have been provided by Commission consideration of the
question at the time of issuance of the initial permit itself, and the
Commission's plenary power in furtherance of the national transportation
policy is retained.
The right of interchange, as closely analogous to powers already pos-
sessed by converting carriers under the contract carriage agency device,
should be fully available after conversion. Any appreciation of com-
petitive position which may derive from such interchange privileges arises
not from the grant of the privileges themselves-which were already
possessed in full-but from potentially increasing utilization of the
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privileges under a greater volume traffic made possible by other aspects
of the carriers' new status. These other advantageous aspects, in their
turn, are more than adequately offset by new duties incident to common
carriage. Interchange, already assimilated into existing competitive struc-
tures, seems necessary to allow the new common carriers fair opportunity
to compete with the old.
Finally, those converting carriers whose permits were subject to
"keystone" restriction should be granted certificates limited by precisely
equivalent commodity specification. Such limitation is implied in the
intendment, if not within the plain meaning, of the "same commodities"
clause of the amendment, and seems plainly required to avoid the setting
loose of vast new competitive forces potentially disruptive of the existing
balance of the transport market structure.
A.S.M.
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THE MARITAL DEDUCTION IN FEDERAL ESTATE
TAX: THE TERMINABLE INTEREST RULE
INTRODUCTION
The marital deduction provisions of the 1948 Revenue Act' were
enacted as part of an overall plan 2 to equate the tax burden of the common-
law and community property states and to eliminate the inequities which
had resulted from the ill-fated attempt of the 1942 Revenue Act.8  The
marital deduction provisions of the estate tax adopt, as do both the gift and
income taxes,4 a community property theory for the taxation of marital
property.5 In general, the amount of a decedent's estate which can qualify
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §812(e), added by ch. 3, 62 Stat. 117 (1948) (now
INv. Rm. CODE OF 1954, § 2056).
2. As part of this plan to redress the tax inequality between common-law and
community property states the act also contained provisions for the allowance of marital
deductions for gifts. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2523; LOWNDES & KRAmER,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GnFT TAXES 791-805 (1956).
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§811(d)(5), (e)(2), (g)(4), added by ch. 619,
56 Stat. 941 (1942). Prior to 1942, the estate tax on transfers between husband and
wife depended upon the property law of the state where the transfer took place. Since
in the community property states only one-half of the community property belonged
to one spouse, only half was subject to the estate tax upon the death of either spouse.
On the other hand, in the common-law state in the usual situation all the property
belonged to the husband under state law, and thus the family estate was taxed in its
totality at the husband's death. This resulted in geographic discriminations as to
the amount of tax which would be imposed upon two similar estates.
The 1942 provisions attempted to equalize the tax burden throughout the country
by treating community property as being in the estate of the first to die, except such
portion as could be shown to have been received as compensation for personal services
actually rendered. The criterion of economic attribution was thus substituted for
legal ownership in the community property states, while legal ownership remained
the basis for taxation in the common-law states. The difficulty in tracing the source
of the community property, plus the fact that a husband in a community property
state could not leave his entire estate to his wife for life and remainder to his children,
since under state law the wife automatically owned one-half of the community property,
resulted in an estate in a community property state being worse off tax-wise than a
similar estate in a common-law state. H.R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-26
(1948); 1 Bows, ESTATE PLANNING AND TAXATION 65-66 (1957); LowNDEs &
KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES 371-72 (1956); Parks, At Introduction
to the Marital Deduction Under the Federal Estate Tax Law, 23 RocK" MT. L. REV.
295 (1951). But see Surrey, Federal Estate Taxation of the Family-The Revenue
Act of 1948, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1097, 1118 (1948).
4. The method employed to eliminate the income tax advantages which residents
of the community property states had enjoyed over residents of the common-law
states was to allow spouses who file a joint return to divide their combined income
between them. Several states by the adoption of the community property system
had sought to grant' to their citizens these tax advantages. The enactment of the
1948 Code made such "home remedies" unnecessary, since by splitting their combined
incomes husbands and wives in a common-law state are generally afforded the same
tax advantages as comparable spouses in a commuity property state. INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 2; BRUTON & BRADLEY, CASES ON FEDERAL TAXATION 138-39 (1955);
Surrey, supra note 3 at 1103-1116. See also S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. 27 (1948).
5. The marital deduction provisions were variously criticized. It was claimed
that they would not create the geographic equality which was the draftsmen's espoused
(1176)
THE TERMINABLE INTEREST RULE
for the marital deduction is one-half the adjusted gross estate 1 of the
decedent, or if the property passing to the surviving spouse is less than
that amount, then only the property so passing can qualify.7 Since the
deduction is computed on the basis of the estate of the first spouse to die,
and the estate of the surviving spouse is immaterial in the computation, a
bisection rather than an equal division of a family's estate is made. In
contrast, in the community property states there is a true splitting of a
family's assets since each spouse is the owner of one-half of the community
property.8 Thus, the division is made on the basis of the total family
estate and not just one-half of the estate of the first spouse to die.
TERMINABLE INTEREST RULE
Underlying the marital deduction provisions are the two basic premises
that equality of estate taxation should not depend upon the residence of
the decedent,9 and that property which is not taxed in the estate of the first
spouse to die, should be taxed in the estate of the survivor.10 The latter
proposition is of course modified to the extent that the property is consumed
or given away." To realize these premises the concept of terminable
interest was introduced to limit the kind of interests in property which
could qualify for the marital deduction. A terminable interest is defined
in the Internal Revenue Code as an interest in property passing to the
surviving spouse which "on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an
aim, would benefit only the rich and would cause unnecessary revenue losses. Hear-
ings on H.R. 4790 Before the Senate Coninittee on Finance, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
24-25 (1948) ; H.R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1948) (minority). See
generally Surrey, supra note 3.
6. INT. REV. CoDE or 1954, §2056(c) (1).
7. INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 2056 (a).
8. Hearings o H.R. 4790 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. 26 (1948); Anderson, The Marital Deduction and Equalization Under the
Federal Estate and Gift Taxes Between Common Law and Community Property
States, 54 MicR. L. REV. 1087-88 (1956). In the community property states half of
the community property belongs to the wife. Thus only the half of the estate of which
the husband is the legal owner will be taxed upon his death. But in the common-law
states the deduction is allowed upon one-half of the adjusted gross estate of the first
spouse to die, which may mean that if the wife dies first owning a small portion of
the total family estate, the deduction has very little effect. Where the husband dies
first owning the majority of the family assets the significance of the marital deduction
may correspondingly increase.
9. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-29 (1948); Pitts v. Hamrick, 228
F2d 486 (4th Cir. 1955) ; California Trust Co. v. Riddell, 136 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Cal.
1955); Weyenberg v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Wis. 1955); Parks,
supra note 3.
10. Estate of Reilly v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 797, 799 (3d Cir. 1957); State-
ment of Allan H. W. Higgins, Chairman, American Bar Association, Section of
Taxation, during Hearings on H.R. 4790 Before the Senate Committee on Finaice,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. 309, 316 (1948). But see Estate of Pipe v. Commissioner, 241
F.2d 210, 214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814 (1957): "[T]he possibility of
double taxation is not a sufficient basis for allowing a marital deduction if the bequest
does not comply with the specific statutory requirements of section 812 (e)." Cf.
Starrett v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1955).
11. See S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1948).
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event or contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur
. . will terminate or fail," 12 if it will terminate for less than an adequate
consideration and if a person other than the surviving spouse may possess
or enjoy any part of the property.'3 It also includes an interest which
may terminate or fail if it "is to be acquired for the surviving spouse,
pursuant to the directions of the decedent, by his executor or by the trustee
of a trust." 14 Thus terminable interests can be separated into these two
categories, both of which have the common characteristic that the interest
passing to the surviving spouse must be one which may terminate or fail,
and neither of which can qualify for the marital deduction. As to the first,
it must also pass to someone other than the surviving spouse for less than
an adequate consideration paid to the surviving spouse,15 and must so pass
that "by reason of such passing [that] person (or his heirs or assigns)
may possess or enjoy any part of such property after such termination or
failure of the interest so passing to the surviving spouse." :1 Thus if the
spouse is given a remainder absolutely, it will not be considered termi-
nable, 7 but if given a life estate such interest will be terminable and will
not qualify for the marital deduction,' 8 provided that the life estate is not
the whole interest in the property.' 9 The second type of terminable interest
does not contain a requirement that one other than the surviving spouse
or her estate enjoy it,2° but merely requires that the interest acquired
pursuant to the directions of an executor or trustee may terminate or fail.21
The act also contains three exceptions 22 to the terminable interest rule
which will be considered in detail below. They were designed so that
12. INT. Ray. CoDE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (1).
13. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§2056(b) (1) (A)-(B) ; Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-1
(1958). The Senate committee report states that it "is intended to restrict the
deduction to those cases where the decedent or donor passes to his spouse all of his
interest in the property." S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1948).
14. INT. Ray. CoDE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (1) (C).
15. INr. REV. CODE oF 1954, §2056(b) (1) (A).
16. IxT. Rav. CoDE oF 1954, § 2056(b) (1) (B).
17. S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 8 (1948).
18. Ibid. Cf. Estate of Howell, 28 T.C. 1193 (1957) ; Estate of Evilsizor, 27 T.C.
710 (1957) ; Estate of Melamid, 22 T.C. 966 (1954).
19. Some confusion exists here, since the Senate committee report states "an
interest may be a terminable interest under subparagraph (B) of section 8 12 (e),
even though such interest is the entire property. Thus if the property in which the
surviving spouse has an interest, or all of the interest, is terminable, the interest of
the surviving spouse is a terminable interest. Examples of such terminable interests
are patents, copyrights, and annuity contracts." S. RaP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1948). This statement taken in context seems to be referring to both
types of terminable interests, but if this is so, the explicit language of the act, that
another person "may possess or enjoy any part of such property after such termina-
tion or failure of the interest so passing to the surviving sponse," is ignored. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (1) (B). The better interpretation of this statement would
seem to be that it has application only to the second type of terminable interest.
LOWNDES & KRAmER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXEs 391 (1956). See Treas.
Reg. §202056(b)-1(c) and example (6) (1958).
20. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (1) (C).
21. See note 19 supra.
22. INT. R,_. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 2056(b) (3), (5), (6).
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bequests employing the traditional modes of property settlement could
qualify for the marital deduction.3
The foregoing summary indicates that in determining whether the
marital deduction provisions are fulfilling their avowed purposes 24 the
pivotal question must be whether the complex terminable interest rule with
•its attendant exceptions is performing its designed function. In this Note,
a retrospective consideration of its purposes will be made in light of the
cases which have arisen.
OPERATION OF THE RULE
Possibility of Failure is Sufficient
In interpreting the language of section 2056 that "an interest passing to
the surviving spouse will terminate or fail," 25 the courts, relying on the
legislative history,26 have consistently held that it is sufficient that the
interest may fail and that there is no requirement that it must certainly
terminate. For example, the statute provides as an exception that an
interest will not be considered terminable where it is conditioned upon
survival for a period not exceeding six months.27 In several cases 28 which
have arisen where limitations involving the death of the surviving spouse
have been imposed which could have occurred within this six-month
period, the courts have held that the possibility that they would not occur
within the prescribed time was sufficient to disqualify the interest, and
the marital deduction would not be allowed.
In the leading case of Kasper v. Kellar 2 9 a bequest to the wife was
conditioned upon her being alive at the time of distribution of the estate.
Distribution was actually made within the six-month period allowed by
the exception, and the district court held this to be determinative. The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the determination that
what had in fact happened controlled, on the ground that if there was a
possibility as of the time of the husband's death that the interest would be
terminable, the fact that later developments eliminated that possibility
23. Statement of Allan H. W. Higgins, supra note 10.
24. It is of course true that just what is the purpose of the marital deduction
provisions has been the subject of some discussion in the cases. Obviously the intent
of the draftsmen was to create a system of estate taxation that would have a sub-
stantial amount of geographic equality. But whether a husband and wife should be
treated as an entity for the purpose of estate taxation, that is, whether if property is
taxed in the estate of the first spouse to die, it will not be taxed in the estate of the
second, has caused a divergence of opinion. See authorities cited notes 9, 10 supra.
25. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (1).
26. S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1948).
27. INT. Rzv. CODE oF 1954, § 2056(b) (3). Obviously this section was included
so that the use of conventional common-disaster clauses in wills would not make an
interest terminable and thus prevent it from qualifying for the marital deduction.
See S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1948); LOWNDES & KRA-IER,
FEDmAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 398 (1956).
28. Kasper v. Kellar, 217 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1954); California Trust Co. v.
Riddell, 136 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Cal. 1955) ; Estate of Street, 25 T.C. 673 (1955).
29. 217 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1954).
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would not qualify the bequest for the marital deduction. However, the
court remanded the case for a determination as to how the contingency
should be interpreted under South Dakota law. Upon rehearing, the
district court held that under South Dakota law the property vested in
the wife as of the time of the decedent's death and thus the bequest did
qualify for the marital deduction 3 Similar bequests have been held to,
qualify for the marital deduction under the laws of Montana and Colorado,3 '
in effect reading "if living at the time of distribution" as meaning "if living
at the time of my death." But in California Trust Co. v. Riddell, 2 the
court held upon the authority of Kasper 3 that they were not bound by the
California rule that the actual time of distribution decides, but that they
should look to the terms of the will which imposed a terminable limitation.
The bequest failed to qualify for the deduction.3 4
In Eggleston v. Dudley 3 5 an insurance policy contained contradictory
language as to the effect of the beneficiary's death, if she died before the
insurance company received proof of the death of the insured 3 6 The
district court indicated that the Pennsylvania cases, even though they
would hold such a legacy to be vested, were immaterial, and held that the
proceeds would not qualify for the deduction.37 Relying upon Pennsylvania
law the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, stating that under
Pennsylvania law "where the terms of the contract are contradictory the
meaning put upon the instrument by the parties themselves is strong
evidence of the correct interpretation of the instrument and will be en-
forced by the courts." 38 The parties had agreed that the insured's intention
was to qualify the proceeds of the policy for the deduction, and therefore,
the instrument would be interpreted to allow the deduction. This case
illustrates two possible approaches which may be taken to determine
whether a bequest qualifies for the deduction. On the one hand, the district
court looked to the possible failure of the bequest and concluded that since
the bequest could possibly fail it was immaterial whether Pennsylvania law
30. Kellar v. Kasper, 138 F. Supp. 738 (D.S.D. 1956).
31. Smith v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 344 (D. Col. 1957) ; Steele v. United
States, 146 F. Supp. 316 (D. Mont. 1956).
32. 136 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
33. The incongruity of this holding was pointed out in Golden, A Decade with
the Marital Deduction, 97 TRUSTS & EsTATEs 304, 355 (1958).
34. Cf. Estate of Street, 25 T.C. 673 (1955), where upon the authority of Kasper,
it was held that the interest was terminable even though the wife survived distribution
of the estate.
35. 257 F2d 398 (3d Cir. 1958).
36. The policy stated: "If said Beneficiary be not living when said Company
receives due proof of my death, or if said Beneficiary shall die after receipt of such
proof and before all the instalments within the certain period shall have been paid,
the proceeds or the commuted value of such unpaid instalments shall be paid in one
sum to the Executors or Administrators of said Beneficiary, if she dies after receipt
by said Company of due proof of my death, or to my Executors, Administrators or
Assigns, if said beneficiary be not living when said Company receives due proof of
my death." Id. at 399.
37. 154 F. Supp. 178 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
38. 257 F.2d at 400.
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would characterize the interest as vested or contingent.3 9 On the other
hand, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, because of the possible
ambiguity of the insurance contract, followed the Pennsylvania law that
in such a case the intention of the parties should be controlling. The
ambiguity in the language of the policy would appear to allow either inter-
pretation. But the critical point is that the decision of what interpretation
to give to the instrument was made by the Court of Appeals in reliance
upon state law.
In Starrett v. Commissioner 40 the will provided that the wife would
have the power to demand the corpus, but in the event of her legal
incapacity or the appointment of a guardian, her right to demand payment
was to cease. The wife actually exercised the power and acquired the
entire corpus.41 The court disregarded the contention that the clause
in question provided for the same result as the controlling state law where
a person became legally incapacitated, so that the condition contained in
the will was just a statement of what would occur whether or not so
stipulated in the will. The court distinguished what would occur in Rhode
Island in the absence of such a clause by the fact that the suspension of the
ability to exercise the power would be only temporary, during the period
of legal incapacitation, while the cessation of the power to invade the
corpus was permanent under the terms of the instrument.
42
The distinction made by the court is supported by the legislative
history. The Senate report stated that "the interest of the surviving
spouse is not considered a terminable interest merely because her possession
or enjoyment may be affected by events not provided for by the terms of
the bequest." 4 Thus, though the property may be destroyed by fire the
interest is not terminable, but where the contingency is stipulated by the
bequest it would appear to be terminable no matter how unlikely it is that
the event will occur. However, it is possible that even though a condition
is stipulated by the terms of a bequest it will not render an interest
terminable if the court can be persuaded to look to the state law for an
interpretation of the meaning of the condition, and the state law is inter-
39. S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1948) states: "It is imma-
terial whether the interest passing to the surviving spouse is considered as a vested
interest subject to divestment or as a contingent interest." In either event, the report
indicates that the interest is terminable.
40. 223 F.2d 163 (lst Cir. 1955). This case has been criticized in 45 Ky. L.J.
355 (1957).
41. The parties had agreed that the power to invade was the equivalent of a
power of appointment, and thus there was no discussion of whether in any event the
power would qualify under the exception for power of appointment. 223 F.2d at 166.
42. The effect of the incompetency of the surviving spouse has been considered
by the Commissioner in a ruling. It was concluded that the marital deduction was
allowable where a wife was devised in trust a life estate with a general power of
consumption and disposition over the corpus and she was mentally'incompetent from
the time of her husband's death. Rev. Rul. 55-518, 1955-2 Cum. Buu.. 384. See
Anderson, supra note 8, at 1104-07.
43. S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1948).
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preted in such a manner that the bequest is not terminable. 4  Thus there
exists a range of possibilities as to how a particular case will be decided.
This obviously does not accord with the intent of the draftsmen that there
should be geographic uniformity in estate taxation. Not only can differ-
ences in local property concepts create geographic inequality, but whether
a particular court will look to those local property concepts creates an
additional area where divergent results can be reached. The desire of the
draftsmen was to allow the deduction where the surviving spouse was
"virtually the owner of the property." 4 The purpose of taxing only once
the total family estate could supply the needed criterion for determining
when the surviving spouse is "virtually the owner of the property."
Though this purpose has been rejected by a number of courts,46 it also
would seem to solve some problems of geographic inequality. In any
event the moral for the planner is clear: the terms of the instrument would
follow the language of the statute and avoid survivorship conditions which
might occur beyond the six-month period allowed by the exception.
Effect of Elections, Disclaimers and Settlements
Whether or not an interest passing to the surviving spouse qualifies
for the marital deduction is generally determined by the interest passing
from the decedent and not by what the spouse actually receives. But if the
spouse under local law elects to take against the will, what she receives as
a result of her election is considered as passing from the decedent,47 if it is
found that an election has actually been made. Thus where a wife elected
not to take under the will, but instead to take the cash value of her dower
and homestead interests measured by her life expectancy, it was held that
this amount qualified for the marital deduction.48 However, where the
bequest is a terminable interest and the spouse takes under the will, the
marital deduction is not allowed, even though had the spouse elected to
take against the will what she would have received under applicable state
44. Compare Kasper v. Kellar, 217 Fl2d 744 (8th Cir. 1954); Smith v. United
States, 158 F. Supp. 344 (D. Colo. 1957) ; Steele v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 316
(D. Mont 1956), with California Trust Co. v. Riddell, 136 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Cal.
1955).
45. In discussing the power of appointment exception the Senate committee report
stated: "These provisions have the effect of allowing a marital deduction with respect
to the value of property transferred in trust by or 'at the direction of the decedent
where the surviving spouse, by reason of her right to the income and a power of
appointment, is the virtual owner of the property. This provision is designed to allow
the marital deduction for such cases where the value of the property over which the
surviving spouse has a power of appointment will (if not consumed) be subject to
eitlwr the estate tax or the gift tax in the case of such surviving spouse." S. REP.
No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1948). (Emphasis added.) See S. REP,. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1954) ; Estate of Pipe v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210
(2d Cir.) (dissent), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814 (1957).
46. Cases cited note 10 supra.
47. Treas. Reg. §202056(e)-2(c) (1958).
48. United States v. Traders Nat'l Bank, 248 F2d 667 (8th Cir. 1957).
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law would not have been a terminable interest.49 In Estate of Kleinman v.
Commissioner -5 the wife was dissatisfied with the life estate she was to
receive under the will so she entered into an agreement with the trustees
of the residue of her husband's estate, under which agreement she was to
receive a stipulated amount per week from the trustees. It was stated in
the agreement that this arrangement was entered into by the wife "instead
of renouncing the will." 51 The court held that she had not elected to take
against the will and all that she received was what had been provided for
by the will. Since that was a terminable interest her weekly payments
would not qualify for the marital deduction.
What the surviving spouse receives as a result of a bona fide settlement
is considered as passing from the decedent.5 2  In Estate of Barrett
where a settlement payment was made to the surviving husband by the
executor of his wife's estate so that her will could be probated without
contest, it was held that the payment qualified for the deduction. In this
situation the determination of whether the interest passing to the surviving
spouse is terminable depends upon what is received and not what was
provided for in the will. In Estate of Tebb 54 the wife was bequeathed an
absolute remainder of her husband's estate, but in a controversy between
her and his children she agreed not to make any disposition of the interest
passing to her except what she might need for her normal care and
maintenance. It was held that the interest was terminable, though what
she would have received under the terms of the will would have been a
deductible interest.
The statute provides for those situations where the spouse disclaims
in favor of another,55 or where a disclaimer made by a third person benefits
the wife.5 6 In neither of these situations is the deduction allowed. In the
latter, the husband had no intention of benefiting his wife, a third person
actually being the motivating force, and therefore the marital deduction
should have no application. In the former, if the deduction were to be
allowed it would provide an easy method for the benefits of the deduction
to be passed on to those for whom it was not intended to have any ap-
plication.
5 7
49. Treas. Reg. § 202056(e) -(2) (c) (1958). S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. 11 (1948).
50. 25 T.C. 1245 (1956), aff'd, 245 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1957).
51. Id. at 1248.
52. If the settlement is pursuant to a decision of a local court upon the merits in
adversary proceeding following a genuine contest, it will be presumed bona fide.
Where it is pursuant to a decree entered into by consent or an agreement not to
contest a will, it will not necessarily be accepted as bona fide. Treas. Reg. § 202056
(e)-2(d) (2) (1958).
53. 22 T.C. 606 (1954).
54. 27 T.C. 671 (1957).
55. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(d) (1).
56. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(d) (2).
57. LoWNDES & K.aAmER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GI=T TAxEs 384-85 (1956).
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In the three situations discussed above, i.e., where a spouse enters into
a settlement, elects to take against the will or disclaims in favor of another,
the purpose of geographic uniformity has, to a considerable extent, been
realized, since the courts have generally not looked to state law. In the
settlement cases the only criterion to be employed is whether there has
been a bona fide settlement and if so, what type of interest the spouse
receives as a result of that settlement. As to disclaimers, there is a clear
statutory mandate which prohibits the deduction in all cases. The only
geographic variance in the situation where a spouse elects to take against
the will is created by a difference in state law as to the type of interest
which such an election gives to the spouse. 8 This seems to be geographic
inequality which can only be remedied by action of the individual states.
Where only a life estate is given to the electing spouse, under the policy
of the act the deduction should not be allowed, for otherwise the interest
would escape taxation in the estates of both spouses. Also, those interests
which are not the virtual equivalent of unrestricted ownership or are not
made so under applicable state law are not within the ambit of the geo-
graphic inequities which the statute was designed to alleviate, since they are
not comparable to the type of interest which spouses in community property
states have in the community property.
Enjoyment of Property By One Other Than the Surviving Spouse
For an interest other than one acquired by an executor or trustee to
be considered terminable, it must also pass to someone other than the
surviving spouse or her estate after the termination of the surviving spouse's
interest. 59 Thus the Senate report states that in the case of certain property
a marital deduction may be allowed, even though the interest is terminable,
as long as no person will enjoy the property after the termination of the
spouse's interest.60 The example which is given is that of a decedent
bequeathing all the interest he ever had in a patent or copyright 6 1 to his
wife and daughter as tenants in common, in which case the wife would
be allowed the marital deduction as to the amount of her interest in the
patent.
In Estate of Reilly v. Commissioner 0 2 a life insurance contract pro-
vided that if the wife survived the husband, which she did, she would receive
58. Cf. Estate of Jaeger v. Commissioner, 252 F2d 790 (6th Cir. 1958) ; United
States v. Traders Nat'l Bank, 248 F2d 667 (8th Cir. 1957); Pitts v. Hamrick, 228
F2d 486 (4th Cir. 1955); Crosby v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 810 (N.D. Fla.
1956); Weyenberg v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Wis. 1955). An analo-
gous situation where state law is determinative is 'whether the surviving spouse's
share is diminished by the federal estate tax before the determination of her interest.
Compare United States v. Traders Nat'l Bank, 248 F2d 667 (8th Cir. 1957) ; Pitts v.
Hamrick, 228 F2d 486 (4th Cir. 1955); Weyenberg v. United States, 135 F. Supp.
299 (ED. Wis. 1955), withl Estate of Jaeger v. Commissioner, 252 F2d 790 (6th
Cir. 1958) ; Estate of Juster, 25 T.C. 669 (1955).
59. INT. Rm. CODE OF 1954, §2056(b) (1) (B).
60. S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1948).
61. Ibid.
62. 239 F2d 797 (3d Cir. 1957).
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monthly installments for ten years certain and thereafter for life; if she
died within the ten year period the remainder was to be paid to surviving
children. The Tax Court held that no part of the proceeds qualified for
the deduction, since the right to the payments under the policy were one
property and not divisible.6 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
taking notice of the purposes of the statute to achieve substantial geographic
equality and to tax only once the total family estate, reversed, holding that
the life estate qualified for the deduction. This result follows the reason-
ing that though only a life estate has been given, the life interest represents
the entire property, and thus there is actually no restriction being placed
upon it and it will not be possible for another to enjoy any part of it. In
contrast, the guarantee of payments for ten years would not qualify, since
the possibility existed that the wife would die before the ten-year period
elapsed, and if so, the payments for the balance of the term would be made
to the surviving children. Therefore, the payments for the ten-year period
met both requirements for a terminable interest, while the life estate, being
analogous to a patent in this situation, would not be enjoyed by another
after the termination of the spouse's interest.
A bequest is not terminable merely because it is made to the estate of
the surviving spouse, since under the provisions of the act a bequest to
the estate of the surviving spouse is the same as a bequest to the spouse
herself.65 In this regard the Senate report carefully distinguished the
case where an interest in the property passes to the estate of the surviving
spouse and that where the bequest is "to W for life, remainder to her
heirs" and the Rule in Shelley's Case is not operative. In the former
situation the wife's interest is not terminable, whereas in the latter it is,
since, where the Rule in Shelley's Case is not operative, the wife has a
terminable interest which will pass to another upon her death6 6 In
Estate of Peterson 6 7 a joint will provided that the first to die devised all
of his estate "to the survivor absolutely and forever" the survivor to have
the right to use all of the estate and "in the event the survivor in his or her
sole discretion may elect so to do, to our children."' 18 The court
recognized that under Nebraska law a joint will was irrevocable where the
survivor accepted benefits of the devise in his favor. It was held that
under Nebraska law the bequest would be construed to confer a life estate
with power of use and disposition for the wife's support, comfort and
63. 25 T.C. 366 (1955). Previously, it had been held that no part of a bequest
would qualify for the deduction when the spouse received only a part of the income
or had the power to appoint only a part of the property. Estate of Sweet v. Com-
missioner, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956); Estate of
Hoffenberg, 22 T.C. 1185 (1954). This result was changed by the 1954 Code. INT.
Rtv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (5). Compare Commissioner v. Estate of Ellis, 252 F.2d
109 (3d Cir. 1958).
64. See Estate of Selling, 24 T.C. 191 (1955).
65. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, §2056(b) (1) (A).
66. S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1948).
67. 23 T.C. 1020, rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 229 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1955).
68. Id. at 1021.
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enjoyment, and thus the interest was terminable and would not qualify
for the deduction.6
A terminable interest which is acquired for the surviving spouse pur-
suant to the directions of the decedent by his executor or by the trustee of
a trust has no requirement that it be enjoyed by anyone after the surviving
spouse.70 The Senate report indicates also that it is immaterial whether
the decedent stipulated what assets were to be used for the purchase.71 It
would seem that if the decedent specified that an annuity be purchased for
his wife out of cash on hand by his executor, the annuity would not
qualify for the deduction, since the interest passing to the surviving
spouse would terminate upon the lapse of time. This result follows even
though the entire interest in the annuity vests in the wife or her estate.72
ExCEPTIONS TO THE RULE
Survivorship
The Code provides three exceptions to the terminable interest rule
which can be broadly categorized as the survivorship,73 life estate with
power of appointment, 74 and insurance settlement exceptions.76 The effect
of the first of these exceptions is to allow the deduction where the bequest
is conditioned upon survival for a period not exceeding six months or where
the termination will occur only as a result of a common disaster and those
conditions do not in fact occur. This provision was not designed to except
those interests where the death of the surviving spouse at any time would
cause a termination of the interest, but only to allow the inclusion of a
survivorship condition without the necessity of having the test of what
might happen applied to it. As has been previously pointed out in the
cases involving the condition that the spouse survive distribution of the
estate,76 the courts are most unwilling to extend this exception beyond the
wording of the statute, although some courts will interpret state law to
qualify a bequest which would otherwise be terminable. Therefore, unless
the condition is so limited that it must occur, if ever, within six months, or
it is so interpreted under state law, it will not qualify for the deduction.
69. Compare Estate of Awtry v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1955);
Estate of Elson, 28 T.C. 442 (1957).
70. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §2056(b) (1) (C).
71. S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1948). INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 2056(b) (2) provides that where the interest passing to the surviving spouse may
be satisfied from a group of assets which includes non-deductible interests, the aggre-
gate value of the terminable interests must be subtracted from the value of the interest
passing to the surviving spouse before the marital deduction is computed. See Treas.
Reg. §202056(b) (2) (1958).
72. LowNmEs & KRAmER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND G=2 TAXES 395 (1956).
73. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2056(b) (3).
74. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (5).
75. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (6).
76. See text accompanying notes 29-34 supra.
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The courts have so held even though the condition precedent to the spouse's
taking has in fact occurred within the six-month period. 7
Powers of Appointment
The life estate with a power of appointment exception has been the
one most frequently before the courts. As originally enacted, in order for
this exception to operate the transfer had to be in trust.78 A bequest of a
legal life estate with power of appointment would not be sufficient to
qualify the property for the deduction. 79 This provision was changed by
the 1954 amendments so that the exception now includes both legal and
equitable interests.80 Also, it is no longer necessary that the surviving
spouse be given the income from the entire property as well as the power
to appoint the entire property.8 ' It is now sufficient if the spouse be given
a specific portion of the income plus the power to appoint that portion.
8 2
The statute requires that certain conditions be fulfilled before the power
of appointment exception is operative. Thus the surviving spouse must be
entitled to the income of all or a specific portion for life, which income
must be payable annually or at more frequent intervals.8 The power of
appointment must be such that the spouse can exercise it in all events in
favor of herself or her estate.8 4 Also, no one other than the surviving
spouse can have the power to appoint to anyone other than the surviving
spouse sJ
The reason behind the power of appointment exception was that it
was thought desirable to give recognition to one of the customary forms of
settlement used in the common-law states,86 especially inasmuch as the
effect of such a bequest would be comparable to the situation in the com-
munity property states. The Senate report stated that the "provisions
have the effect of allowing a marital deduction . . . where the surviving
spouse, by reason of her right to the income and a power of appointment,
is the virtual owner of the property. This provision is designed to allow the
marital deduction for such cases where the value of the property over which
the surviving spouse has a power of appointment will (if not consumed)
be subject to either the estate tax or the gift tax in the case of such surviving
spouse." 8 7 Thus the Senate report gives recognition to the principle that
77. California Trust Co. v. Riddell, 136 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
78. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §812(e) (1) (F), added by cit 168, §361(a), 62 Stat.
117 (1948).
79. Estate of Pipe v. Connissioner, 241 F2d 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 814 (1957) ; see also Estate of Melamnid, 22 T.C. 966 (1954).
80. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (5).
81. See note 63 sztpra.




86. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1948).
87. S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1948).
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the deduction should be allowed where the property will be taxed in the
estate of the survivor. Unfortunately, section 2041 (b) of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code, which supplies the criterion for determination of when the
value of property over which decedent had a power of appointment should
be included in the decedent's gross estate, is cast in broader terms than
the power of appointment exception to the terminable interest rule. Thus
a power of appointment which is exercisable in favor of the donee of the
power, his estate, his creditors or creditors of his estate is taxable in his
estate.88 Therefore, the possibility exists that a power will not be held
sufficient to qualify the property for the deduction, and thus the property
will be taxed in the estate of the first spouse to die, although the power, if
exercisable in favor of creditors, may be sufficiently broad to also suffer
taxation again in the estate of the survivor.
In Estate of Allen 8 9 the wife was the donee of an apparently un-
restricted testamentary power of appointment.9° Nevertheless, the Tax
Court held that under a Maryland law the wife could not appoint to herself,
her creditors, or to her estate, and that therefore the power did not qualify
for a marital deduction. The court took the position that although the
committee reports indicated that the nature of the power was to be deter-
mined without regard to nomenclature and local property law connotations
that this had reference to the formalisms and not to the substance of the
local property law.Y1 This result seems correct since the type of interest
conveyed in the instant case clearly is not comparable to that which a spouse
has in community property. In Estate of Evilsizor 92 a devise was made
to the husband for life and upon his death to his children, the husband in
his best interest being entitled to sell, convey or transfer any or all property.
The court found that under Ohio law the remainder in the children was
vested. The court stated: "The general rule is that a life estate is not
enlarged to an estate in fee simple by reason of the addition of a power of
disposal in the life tenant" '3 and thus the interest was terminable.9 4 It
would seem, however, that the value of the above power could be taxable in
the estate of the husband, since apparently the husband could appoint to
his creditors.9 This is an unfortunate result of the statute as it is currently
drafted, for, sections 2041 and 2056 not being mutually exclusive, the
courts must look to local property concepts for determination of what
88. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(b) (1); see Note, 46 Ky. L.J. 586 (1958).
89. 29 T.C. 465 (1957).
90. The wife was given the power to appoint the principal to "such person or
persons and in such manner, shares and proportions, as she shall appoint...
Id. at 466.
91. Id. at 467-68.
92. 27 T.C. 710 (1957).
93. Id. at 712.
94. Accord, Estate of Howell, 28 T.C. 1193 (1957).
95. See Estate of Pipe v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 814 (1957), which rejected the argument that the possibility of double
taxation was a sufficient reason for allowing the marital deduction. Cf. Starrett v.
Commissioner, 223 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1955).
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interest is given. Thus, the statutory purpose of treating a husband and
wife as a taxable entity is ignored to a great extent. Of course, careful
draftsmanship of powers of appointment can avoid this problem, but the
effect of local law must be carefully studied to ascertain whether it will
have the effect of allowing appointment to the creditors of the donee of
the power but not to the donee o" his estate. If the local law is so inter-
preted, the property subject to the power will be taxed in both the estates
of the husband and the wife.
The test of absolute ownership as determined by applicable state law
has been strictly applied in the power of appointment cases. In Commis-
sioner v. Estate of Ellis 1 the wife was devised a life estate in trust with
power to invade the corpus as she in her sole discretion might decide
was required. The remainder was to go one-half to her estate and one-half
to the children. The will also contained a spendthrift clause which the
court found under Pennsylvania law prevented the donee of the power from
depleting the estate to defeat the clear intention of the testator. This was
held to prevent one-half of the estate from qualifying for the marital deduc-
tion, since it could not be equated with the absolute ownership of spouses
in the community property states. The unfortunate result of such a test is
that varying results as to whether a particular bequest will qualify for the
deduction will be reached as local property concepts vary, 7 and thus the
purpose of geographic uniformity is frustrated.
Insurance Settlements
The third exception to the terminable interest rule is that which gives
the surviving spouse an interest in insurance proceeds and the equivalent
of a general power of appointment.98 The Senate committee report states
that the same principles underlying the marital deduction as to power of
appointment are also applicable to the proceeds of life insurance.99 The
provision has engendered very little litigation, and the results of cases
involving the power of appointment are generally applicable to it.
CONCLUSION
That the purpose of Congress to achieve substantial geographic uni-
formity in estate taxation was a commendable aim, is not open to dispute.
But it is obvious that the marital deduction provisions have not accom-
plished any substantial degree of geographic uniformity. Mainly this has
96. 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958).
97. Other cases illustrating the importance of local property concepts are Estate
of Pipe v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814 (1957) ;
Matteson v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 535 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd o procedure, 240
F2d 517 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Estate of Melamid, 22 T.C. 966 (1954). See also McGehee
v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1958).
98. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 2056(b) (6).
99. S. REP No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1948).
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been due to the important role which state property concepts have played
in the interpretation of these provisions. In the limited area where the
statute supplied clear standards and results have not been made to turn
upon applicable state law the happenstance of geographic location has not
varied the tax consequences of bequests. Illustrative of this are cases in
which a settlement,100 disclaimer or an "election is made by the surviving
spouse. Where the statute fails to supply the necessary guidance for the
courts, however, they have been forced to turn to state law to determine
the type of interest that has been passed and then to apply the "terminable
interest test" to see whether the interest qualifies for the marital deduction.
Perhaps the most severe criticism of the operation of the terminable
interest rule is that there is considerable uncertainty created by courts'
reliance upon local property concepts. 0 1 This is particularly true from
the standpoint of an estate planner who, in drafting an instrument, must
seek to comply with the provisions of the statute and then calculate the
possible effect which state law as interpreted by a federal court will give to
the terms of the instrument. 1 2  Moreover, doubt as to how much of local
property law will be incorporated by a court leaves another vast area of
uncertainty for the planner.103
It would seem that if geographic uniformity is to be achieved in this
area, the federal courts must depart from a strict adherence to local law.
The courts have striven for uniformity between the common-law and
community property states, but in interpreting the terminable interest rule
they have been unable to accomplish any degree of geographic uniformity
between the various versions of the common-law rules. The suggestion
has been made that the "draftsmen of federal tax statutes will have to face
up to the necessity of more precisely defining their terms" o4 and describe
the tax areas which are subject to state property concepts and those where
the federal courts should develop a federal substantive law with the guidance
of the statute. Another alternative would be to treat husband and wife as
100. However, a settlement will be presumed bona fide where it is pursuant to a
decision of a local court. See note 52 supra.
101. For a general discussion of the effect of state law on federal tax proceedings
see Oliver, The Nature of the Compulsive Effect of State Law in Federal Tax Pro-
ceedings, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 638 (1953).
102. The "distribution cases" illustrate a situation where under the terms of the
statute such a bequest will not qualify for the deduction, but if local law is interpreted
as favoring the early vesting of property, the bequest will qualify. See note 28 supra
and accompanying text.
103. Thus in Estate of Allen, 29 T.C. 465 (1957), the court stated that it is true
the committee reports indicate that the nature of a power is to be determined without
regard to local property law connotations; however, this does not apply to the sub-
stance of local law but refers to mere formalisms. Of course, this leaves open the
question of what is substance and what are mere formalisms. Id. at 467-68. As to
the binding effect of a state court's determination see Steel v. United States, 146
F. Supp. 316 (D. Mont. 1956) ; Weyenberg v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 299 (E.D.
Wis. 1955); Estate of Wynekoop, 24 T.C. 167 (1955). See also Oliver, .rupra note
101, at 646-53, 662-67.
104. Id. at 669.
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a taxable entity, and thus what is or will be taxed in the estate of one spouse
will not be taxed in the estate of the other.105 In any event it seems clear
that until the federal courts depart from their reliance upon state law, or
until Congress defines the areas where there shall be a federal substantive
law, geographic uniformity will not be achieved.
JB.S.
105. This approach would accord with one of the underlying purposes of the
marital deduction provisions. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
